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THE FEDERAL RULES IN STATE COURTS: A
SURVEY OF STATE COURT SYSTEMS OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
John B. Oakley* and Arthur F. Coon**
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1960 Professor Charles Alan Wright published a comprehensive
survey' of the degree to which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 had
been adopted as the model for practice in state courts. Professor Wright's
survey confirmed Judge Charles E. Clark's3 observation of an "accelerat-
ing trend in the states toward adoption of the federal rules." 4 Then barely
two decades old, the Federal Rules appeared to be the harbinger of
substantial uniformity in American civil procedure. 5
In this article we present a new survey of the civil procedures of the fifty
states and the District of Columbia. We seek to identify those jurisdictions
that have systematically replicated the Federal Rules as the basis for
practice before their civil courts. We also seek to identify states whose civil
procedures are more loosely modeled on the Federal Rules, paying special
attention to each state's procedural disparity from or conformity to the
federal model for the pleading of a civil case. 6
We share the interest of Judge Clark7 and Professor Wright in the pace of
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; B.A. 1969, University of California, Berkeley;
J.D. 1972, Yale University.
**J.D. 1986, School of Law, University of California, Davis; B.A. 1982, University of Southern
California. Law Clerk, 1986-87, Associate Justice Malcolm M. Lucas, Supreme Court of California.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Elizabeth Phillips of the Class of 1987,
School of Law, University of California, Davis.
1. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOL-ZOFF, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 9.1-9.53, at 46-80
(Wright ed. 1960) [hereinafter WRIGHT I].
2. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are hereinafter referred to interchangeably in the text as the
"Federal Rules" or the "FRCP."
3. Judge Clark, the principal draftsman of the Federal Rules, held many distinguished titles in his
remarkable career. See generally C. CLARK, PRoCEDURE-TfE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS OF JUDGE
CHARLES E. CLARK 1-2 (introduction by Wright & Reasoner eds. 1965). Professor Clark joined the Yale
Law School faculty in 1919, became its Dean in 1929, and remained on its faculty throughout his service
on the Second Circuit, on which he sat from 1939 until his death in 1963. We refer to him at all stages in
his career as "Judge Clark."
4. WRIGr I, supra note l,foreword at iii.
5. See generally id. § 9, at 43-46 (uniformity "not an end in itself" but given "clearly superior"
system of procedure under the FRCP "the proponents of uniform state rules of procedure patterned on
the federal rules make a strong case").
6. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
7. Judge Clark enthusiastically documented the rapid progress of the "code pleading" system,
which he championed as superior to the highly technical "issue pleading" system of the common law.
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reform and the prospects for uniformity in American civil procedure. We
undertook a nationwide survey to assess the degree to which state court
civil procedure is now wrought in the image of the Federal Rules. Professor
Wright has most recently written that "in more than half the states the
[federal] rules have been adapted for state use virtually unchanged." 8 But
more specific information has not been available,9 and contemporary
authors have had to make do with generalities in assessing the cross-
currents of diversity and uniformity in modern American civil procedure. ' 0
In the first edition of his great work on code pleading, published in 1928, Judge Clark noted that 28
states and 2 territories had adopted the Field Code and that none of the remaining 21 jurisdictions was
purely a common law pleader. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 19-20 (1928)
[hereinafter CLARK 11. While Judge Clark considered the exorcism of harsh common law technicalities
from state pleading systems to be of preeminent importance in his first survey, see id. at 20, he also
expressed hope that the flourishing spirit of procedural reform would lead to a uniform system of
American civil procedure. Id. at 22. In arguing for vigorous implementation of the 1934 Federal Rules
Enabling Act by the United States Supreme Court, Judge Clark and his Yale colleague, James William
Moore, expressed the cognate hope that the yet-to-be-drafted federal rules might "properly be a model
to all the states." Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 387 (1935). As
Reporter of the Advisory Committee charged with drafting the proposed federal rules, see C. CLARK,
supra note 3, at 3, Judge Clark became the principal draftsman of this model and thereafter tracked its
progress with paternal pride. In 1947, he updated his state-by-state survey in the second edition of his
code pleading treatise, and classified those jurisdictions modeling their procedural systems upon the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as members of the progressive group of "code jurisdictions." C.
CLARK, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 24-25 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter CLARK II]. At this
time, Judge Clark counted 29 states, the District of Columbia, and the entire system of federal trial
courts as "code jurisdictions." Id. at 24-30. Of Judge Clark's original roster of states with codified
systems of civil procedure, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico had converted to systems replicating
the Federal Rules within three years of the rules' adoption, see id. § 10, at 50, and other states had
adopted parts of the rules. Id. at 50-52. This flurry of activity following the rules' adoption prompted
Judge Clark to conclude that national uniformity in systems of civil procedure was becoming a reality.
Id. § 8, at 30-31.
8. C. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 62, at 406 (4th ed. 1983).
9. An interim revision of Professor Wright's 1960 survey was distributed in 1977. C. WRIGHT & F.
ELLIOT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: INTERIM PAMPHLET TO JURISDICTION AND RELATED MAT-
TERS §§ 9-9.53, at 32-69 (1977) [hereinafter WRIGHT II]. Although it was originally contemplated that
a revision of the 1960 survey would be included in the volumes on Jurisdiction and Related Matters, see
4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1008, at 66 n.41; id., § 1012, at 73
n.23, no version of the survey appears in the final, hardbound volumes published as 13-19 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATrERS
(1977-82 & 2d ed. 1984-86). Meanwhile the 1977 survey has been superseded by the bound volumes,
and is no longer in general circulation. But see Rowe, A Comment on the Federalism of the Federal
Rules, 1979 DUKE L.J. 843, 843 n. 1 (citing Professor Wright's 1977 survey). Professor Wright kindly
furnished us with a photocopy of his 1977 survey, but we have assumed that the bound volume
containing the 1960 survey is more readily available to our readers. We have accordingly cited to the
1960 survey (WRIGHT I) in all instances where the cited material appeared in both the 1960 and 1977
versions.
10. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.7, at 21 ("well over halfthe states have
adopted [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] in their entirety or in large part"); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.
KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5. 1, at 238-39 nn. 14-15 (problematic list, without elabora-
tion, of 32 ostensibly notice-pleading states and 3 examples of states with fact-pleading statutes).
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We found the classification of current state systems of civil procedure to
be unexpectedly complicated, primarily because of the pervasive influence
of the Federal Rules on at least some part of every state's civil procedure. "
But by fashioning a strict test for federal "replica" status12 and by focusing
on the pleading policy 3 of jurisdictions that fail this test, we were able to
develop a reasonably sharp picture of state court conformity to the model of
the Federal Rules.
We were surprised to find that only a minority of states have embraced
the system and philosophy of the Federal Rules wholeheartedly enough to
permit classification as true federal replicas. 14 Even more surprising was
our discovery that when a looser test than replication was applied to classify
states as generally following the model of the Federal Rules, the resulting
tally embraced a majority of states but a minority of our national popula-
tion. 15 This was also true if the criterion for affinity to the federal model of
procedure was relaxed to the point of including any "notice pleading"
jurisdiction. 16 Only if the standard of classification is simply a rules-based
system of procedure rather than a procedural code can it be said that
American civil procedure has predominately been made over in the image
of the Federal Rules. 17 Moreover, the pace of state court conversion to
replicas or close analogues of the federal model has slowed to a creep. 18
II. SURVEY OBJECTIVES AND CLASSIFICATORY CRITERIA
A. Survey Objectives and Relationship to Previous Surveys
Both Professor Wright and Judge Clark have published previous nation-
wide surveys of American civil procedure. Each survey was revised and
11. See C. WRloHT, supra note 8, § 62, at 406 ("The excellence of the rules is such that in more
than half the states the rules have been adapted for state use virtually unchanged, and there is not a
jurisdiction that has not revised its procedure in some way that reflects the influence of the federal
rules.").
12. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 31 & 39-40 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Chart I in appendix.
15. See infra Charts II & VI in appendix.
16. See infra Charts HI & VII in appendix.
There are other important features of the Federal Rules, such as liberal joinder policy, penetrating
rights of discovery and effective summary judgment procedures, that are now close to universal in state
practice. Our survey does not attempt to pick up every federal thread in the fabric of state civil
procedure. Notice pleading seems the loosest classification that is in any strong sense constitutive of
federal practice. Moreover, joinder, discovery and summary judgment rules are all satellites to liberal
pleading policies in the overall system of procedure conceived by Judge Clark and embodied in the
Federal Rules.
17. See infra Charts IV & VIII in appendix.
18. See infra Charts IX-XI in appendix.
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reissued after nearly two intervening decades. The ambitions of these
surveys, and the procedural reform they encouraged, have produced a new
mold for our research.
Judge Clark's 1928 survey' 9 eschewed exaggeration of the distinctions
between the "code" and "common law" genres. 20 Judge Clark recognized
that systems with different labels often differed in degree rather than in
kind. Nonetheless, he cautiously sorted the states into three major groups:
the code pleaders, the common-law pleaders, and the hybrids. 21 In so
doing, Judge Clark looked to pleading rules and the merger of law and
equity as "the most important characteristics" of codified systems of
procedure. 22 When he revised his survey in 1947, Judge Clark did not
revise his classificatory scheme; he treated the federal courts and the states
that had modeled their civil procedure on the Federal Rules merely as a
subset of the code pleading category. 23
19. CLARK I, supra note 7, § 8, at 19-22.
20. Id. § 8, at 20.
21. DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS IN 1928:
CODE PLEADING JURISDICTIONS
Alaska Indiana Missouri North Carolina South Carolina
Arizona Iowa Montana North Dakota South Dakota
Arkansas Idaho Nebraska Ohio Utah
California Kansas Nevada Oklahoma Washington
Colorado Kentucky New Mexico Oregon Wisconsin
Connecticut Minnesota New York Puerto Rico Wyoming
COMMON LAW PLEADING JURISDICTIONS
Delaware Florida Maine New Jersey Vermont
District of Illinois New Hampshire Rhode Island Virginia
Columbia West Virginia
HYBRID JURISDICTIONS




Source: CLARK I, supra note 7, § 8, at 19-22.
22. Id. § 7, at 18. Also important, but secondarily so in Judge Clark's view, were liberal rules of
joinder of parties and "of rendering judgments in part for or against the various parties as the justice of
the case may require (the split judgment of equity)." Id. at 19 (italics in original). The "split judgment"
idea is the precursor of the modem partial summary judgment permitted by FRCP 56(d) and analogous
state rules. See CLARK II, supra note 7, § 88, at 562 ("provision for partial summary judgment" is a
"fundamental part of any effective ... summary procedure").
23. DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS IN 1947:
NON-FRCP CODIFIED STATES OR QUASI-CODIFIED STATES
Alabama Indiana Minnesota North Carolina Texas
Alaska Iowa Missouri North Dakota Utah
Arkansas Kansas Montana Ohio Virginia
California Kentucky Nebraska Oklahoma Washington
Connecticut Louisiana Nevada Oregon Wisconsin
Georgia Maryland New Jersey Pennsylvania Wyoming
Idaho Massachusetts New Mexico South Carolina
Illinois Michigan New York South Dakota
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In his 1947 survey Judge Clark recognized that the force of his codified/
non-codified procedural classification was waning. "Classification of the
states not listed" in his group of codified jurisdictions, he wrote, "is
difficult, since all have departed substantially from the common-law sys-
tem and all tend to approach, in quite varying degrees, the system embod-
ied in the codes." 24 By the time of Professor Wright's 1960 survey, the
important classification had become not the fact but the type of what Judge
Clark considered codification. The procedural dichotomy apparent in Pro-
fessor Wright's survey was between procedural systems retaining impor-
tant features of "code pleading" and those systems modeled explicitly on
the Federal Rules. 25 There were, wrote Professor Wright, "19 jurisdictions
in addition to the federal courts" in which "rules substantially similar to the
federal rules are in effect" to the degree that there is "but one procedure for
state and federal courts." 26
There was obvious difficulty in making a comparable statement in 1977,
but only because the pervasive nationwide influence of the Federal Rules
made classification difficult in that all states had adopted federal procedure
to some degree.27 To paraphrase Judge Clark, all states tend to approach, in
FRCP JURISDICTIONS
Arizona Colorado District of
Columbia
COMMON-LAW STATES
Delaware Maine New Hampshire Tennessee West Virginia
Florida Mississippi Rhode Island Vermont
Source: CLARK II, supra note 7, § 8, at 23-31.
24. Id. at 26-27.
25. DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS IN 1960:
MODELED ON FRCP
Alaska District of Kentucky New Jersey Utah
Arizona Columbia Maine New Mexico Washington
Colorado Hawaii Minnesota North Dakota West Virginia
Delaware Idaho Nevada Puerto Rico Wyoming
COMMON LAW
Alabama Georgia Mississippi Pennsylvania Vermont
Florida Maryland New Hampshire Rhode Island Virginia
Massachusetts Tennessee
CODE
Arkansas Indiana Michigan North Carolina South Carolina
California Iowa Missouri Ohio South Dakota
Connecticut Kansas Montana Oklahoma Texas
Illinois Louisiana Nebraska Oregon Wisconsin
New York
Source: WRIGHT I, supra note 1, §§ 9.1-9.53, at 46-80.
26. Id. § 9, at 44, 45.
27. In the 1977 revision of his survey, Professor Wright did not offer a revised figure for the number
ofjurisdictions in which there was "but one procedure for state and federal courts." In summarizing the
degree to which states had modeled their procedures on the Federal Rules, he declared only that "rules
substantially similar to the federal rules are in effect in many states." WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9,
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quite varying degrees, the system embodied in the Federal Rules. Despite
the difficulty of classification, it is accepted as common knowledge that the
Federal Rules are the dominant system of procedure in American law, not
merely by merit but by headcount. 28 Is it really true that in most American
jurisdictions there is "but one procedure for state and federal courts?" 29 If
so, does it follow that most American litigation outside of the federal court
system nonetheless follows a parallel procedural path?
B. Explanation of Classifications
1. Methodology
The system of classification we developed to answer these questions
follows the methodology of Judge Clark in three important respects. First,
we have classified the civil procedures of the states according to their
characteristics as systems of procedures. Second, we do not exaggerate the
precision of our classification scheme: at the margins of our categories, the
differences are surely of degree rather than of kind. And third, we identify
the criteria of classification to which we paid special attention in doubtful
cases.
To anchor our attempt to classify state systems of civil procedure
according to their degree of affinity to the federal model we devised the
status of "Federal Rules replica." In the states to which we accord "replica
status" it is true without significant qualification that there is "but one
procedure for state and federal courts." 30 Using these jurisdictions as our
at 32. In our view this is strong evidence of the difficulty of the question, and of the necessity for the new
system of classification introduced by our survey. Employing the weaker test of classifying as within the
federal camp those jurisdictions having rules "substantially similar to the federal rules," the array of
states in 1977 as classified by Professor Wright was as follows.
MODELED ON FRCP
Alabama Georgia Maine North Carolina Tennessee
Alaska Hawaii Massachusetts North Dakota Utah
Arizona Idaho Minnesota Ohio Vermont
Colorado Indiana Montana Puerto Rico Washington
Delaware Kansas Nevada Rhode Island West Virginia
District of Kentucky New Jersey South Dakota Wisconsin
Columbia New Mexico Wyoming
COMMON LAW
Maryland Mississippi New Hampshire Pennsylvania Virginia
CODE
Arkansas Florida Louisiana Nebraska Oregon
California Illinois Michigan New York South Carolina
Connecticut Iowa Missouri Oklahoma Texas
28. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
29. WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9, at 45.
30. Id.
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reference we classified all other states according to the kind and degree of
their variation from replica status.
Simple side-by-side comparison of state rules of civil procedure and the
Federal Rules, while useful for identifying potential federal replica juris-
dictions, was only the threshold step in our identification of true federal
replicas. After extensive scrutiny of ostensible state court adoptions of the
Federal Rules, we determined that a nine point test was needed to dis-
tinguish systematic replication of the Federal Rules from state court rules
of procedure that were merely aggregations of look-alike counterparts to
particular Federal Rules.
In developing our criteria for replica status, we did not weight all
procedural provisions equally. Following Judge Clark's lead, we treated
those provisions governing pleadings and motions directed to pleadings as
especially important, along with the merger of law and equity into one form
of civil action. 31 Liberality in this general area assures that meritorious
claims will not fail for poor pleading. 32 Fact-pleading language and mo-
tions like the demurrer promote form over substance and thwart Judge
Clark's "procedure as the handmaid of justice" ideal. 33
Liberal joinder and discovery rules and provision for summary judg-
ments were also given special classificatory importance. For example,
progressive third party practice rules 34 and compulsory counterclaims 35
decrease litigation and increase efficiency by disposing of related claims in
31. See generally CLARK I, supra note 7, Preface to the FirstEdition. Clark noted that: "[pirobably
the most important characteristics of the code were the one form of action and the system of pleading the
facts." CLARK II, supra note 7, at 22. He thought the anachronistic failure to merge law and equity was
particularly unfortunate in view of the evils which had prompted merger in progressive jurisdictions:
The division of remedial justice into two systems, with two courts entirely distinct from each
other, intensified the defects inherent in each system. A litigant not infrequently would have to be
sent out of court to bring his action in another tribunal simply because he had chosen the wrong
one. Since the rules governing the choice of tribunal were not always clear and easy of application,
the harm to innocent seekers for justice was great.
Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
32. Accepting the cardinal code principle of the union of law and equity procedures and
emphasizing simple and direct allegation of facts as the basis of pleading, [modem non-code
procedure] adds many details and devices of extensive joinder of parties and of claims, of
discovery and pre-trial investigations of broad issues, and of summary adjudication, to achieve an
expeditious and nontechnical adjudication of disputes.
Clark II, supra note 7, § 1, at 4.
33. See id. § 11, at 54 (pleading "is a means to an end, not an end in itself-the 'handmaid rather
than the mistress' of justice") (footnote omitted). See generally C. Clark, supra note 3.
Less obviously, we attached significance to whether a jurisdiction's practice was to have attorneys
rather than parties sign pleadings, thus dispensing with the verification of pleadings by the parties, see
FRCP 11, since this is indicative of conformity to the Federal Rules' treatment of pleading as a vehicle
for the assembly of facts through discovery rather than the statement of facts already uncovered
extrajudicially.
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
35. See FED. R. Cv. P. 13(a).
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a single main action. Liberal pleading requires liberal discovery in order to
narrow issues for trial, 36 and procedures for summary adjudication of all or
part of a claim or defense to prevent liberality of pleading from clogging the
trial docket. 37
2. Criteria for Classification as a Federal Rules Replica
All jurisdictions we identify as replicating the Federal Rules meet each
of these nine criteria:
(1) state civil procedure is specified in judicially promulgated rules
rather than a statutory code;
(2) these rules are organized and enumerated in general conformity to the
scheme of the FRCP;
(3) there has been a merger of law and equity into one form of civil
action;
(4) the substance of the state rules of civil procedure conform generally
to the federal joinder rules as amended in 1966;
(5) the substance of the state rules of civil procedure conform generally
to the federal discovery rules as amended in 1970;
(6) the state rules provide for summary judgment according to the model
of the Federal Rules;
(7) the rules as written and interpreted provide without qualification for
the liberal conception of "notice pleading" practiced in federal courts
under the aegis of Conley v. Gibson;38
(8) to the extent the terms of the state rules or their interpretations are
otherwise idiosyncratic or unconventional by federal standards, such varia-
tion in practice is not at bottom inconsistent with the Federal Rules'
philosophy of "procedure as the handmaiden of justice"; 39 and
36. See infra note 76 (unsuccessful California experiment sought to simplify civil procedure by
simultaneously relaxing standards for pleading specificity and restricting discovery).
37. See CLARK II, supra note 7, § 88, at 556-63.
38. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Although there have been occasional rebellions against the Conley v.
Gibson conception of notice pleading in the lower federal courts, especially in civil rights cases, see.
e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 203-06 (3d Cir. 1980); Koch v. Yunich, 533
F.2d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1976), the United States Supreme Court has yet to sound the bugle of retreat.
See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 3.11, at 152-56 & n.13 (1983 amendment of
FRCP II may foreshadow future convergence of notice pleading and fact pleading in federal practice,
but the Conley v. Gibson conception of notice pleading remains the keystone of "federal pleading rules
• . . and in this respect they represent a major departure from the codes") (footnote omitted). Cf
Marus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, 86 COLUN,. L. REV.
433 (1986).
39. See generally C. CLARK, supra note 3. Judge Clark's ideal is the theme of the Federal Rules: the
FRCP were designed to promote the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of all civil actions.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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(9) the state courts regard precedent and commentary construing coun-
terpart provisions of the Federal Rules as persuasive authority in the
construction of the state rules.
3. Methodology for Classifying Variation From the Norm of Federal
Rules Replica
In classifying jurisdictions with reference to their variation from the
procedural model of the Federal Rules, we found our task complicated by
the need to account for two distinct kinds of variation. In a sense, the
Federal Rules are not one model but two.
On the one hand the Federal Rules are a model of "notice pleading," and
jurisdictions that depart from the model of the Federal Rules do so because
of differences in the degree of factual specificity demanded in the pleading
of a claim or defense. The principal alternative pleading practice is the
"fact pleading" called for by systems descended from New York's Field
Code of 1848, but the variations in pleading practices among the remaining
code pleading jurisdictions are extensive, and idiosyncrasy abounds.
The range of variation in pleading practices is thus roughly triangular, as
shown in Figure 1. The notice pleading championed by the Federal Rules
and required for classification as a Federal Rules Replica places ajurisdic-
tion at one point of this triangle. Jurisdictions varying from the Federal
Rules will vary along two dimensions within this range. One dimension
measures affinity to the fact pleading epitomized by code systems of
procedure; the other dimension measures the degree to which a jurisdic-
tion's pleading practices tend toward the idiosyncratic, and are thus foreign
to both the classic code systems and the Federal Rules. 40
On the other hand, the Federal Rules are also a model for the structure of
a procedural system. Again, variation proceeds along two dimensions, so
that the range of variation lies within three points as depicted in Figure 2. At
one point of this triangle of variation is the structural type epitomized by the
40. Although Figure I illustrates conceptually how variation from the federal paradigm may run in
two directions, toward fact pleading or toward idiosyncratic pleading, we have not further complicated
the classifications deployed in our survey by seeking to account for the kind and degree of variation from
the Conley v. Gibson conception of notice pleading characteristic of practice under the Federal Rules.
See supra note 38. We have classified all jurisdictions which fail the Conley test of wholehearted
commitment to notice pleading as fact pleading jurisdictions, without attempt further to specify how
close or how far from federal practice lies the pleading system in question. No doubt this has achieved
simplicity at the cost of arbitrariness, and has confused within our "fact pleading" classification
jurisdictions that verge on notice pleading with both classic fact pleading jurisdictions and jurisdictions
whose pleading practices might better be termed idiosyncratic (as suggested by the conceptual model of
Figure 1). We readily acknowledge that much work remains to be done in the study of variation among
the states concerning standards of specificity in pleading and other aspects of pleading practice.
1375
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Federal Rules, a rules-based system of procedure in which the operative
rules of civil procedure are judicially promulgated. The most common
contrary structure for a procedural system is a legislative code. One state's
procedural system is so idiosyncratic in structure, however, that a second
dimension of variation must be acknowledged.
Juxtaposition of the types and ranges of variation described in Figures 1
and 2 place the Federal Rules and state procedural systems replicating them
in the central position illustrated by Figure 3. Since classification of
variation from federal replica status is our goal, the ranges of variation in
pleading and structure are presented in Figure 3 as contiguous at the point
within each range occupied by federal replica jurisdictions-a point de-
fined by notice pleading and a rules-based system of procedure.
Federal Rules Replicas
Notice Pleadin
Classic Code f H)TE O Idiosyncratic
Systems 9 MEMEMM Systems
Fact ,dio-
Pleading syncrat ic
Figure 1: Variation in procedural systems
according to type of pleading
Federal Rules Replicas
Ru Ie3-B3aeed
Classic Code M Idiosyncratic
Systems Systems
Code- ldio-
Based syncrat i c
Figure 2: Variation in procedural systems
according to structure of system
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Figure 3: Variation from Federal Rules Replica status
according to independent variables of pleading
and structure
C. Summary of Classifications of Procedural Systems
The variation we encountered in our survey led us to develop a total of
eight classifications.
(1) Federal Rules Replica. As discussed above, this is our cardinal
classification. These jurisdictions meet all nine of our criteria for sys-

















(2) Notice Pleading/Federal-Rules-Model Procedural System. These
jurisdictions show strong affinity to the content and organization of the
Federal Rules, including notice pleading, but for the reasons we recite do
not meet some of the other criteria for federal replica status.
These jurisdictions are:
IDAHO MISSISSIPPI NEVADA
(3) Notice Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System.
These are systems of procedure based on judicially promulgated rules but





(4) Notice Pleading/Idiosyncratic Procedural System. This was our
classification for one notice-pleading jurisdiction, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
whose procedural system defied classification as either code-based or
rules-based.
(5) Notice Pleading/Federal Code Procedural System. These jurisdic-
tions operate under statutorily adopted versions of the Federal Rules.
Because their procedural systems are code-based rather than rules-based,




(6) Fact Pleading/Federal-Rules-Model Procedural System. These pro-
cedural systems replicate the Federal Rules in most respects but substitute
some higher standard of factual specificity in pleading.
These jurisdictions are:
ARKANSAS DELAWARE SOUTH CAROLINA
(7) Fact Pleading/Idioynscratic Rules-Based Procedural System. These
systems demand factual specificity in pleading and operate according to
rules-based systems of procedure that are not substantially similar to the
Federal Rules in their content or organization.
These jurisdictions are:
FLORIDA NEW JERSEY PENNSYLVANIA
MARYLAND OREGON TEXAS
MISSOURI VIRGINIA
(8) Fact Pleading/Code-Based Procedural System. This classification
covers the remainder of states, which have neither notice pleading nor a
rules-based procedural system in common with the Federal Rules.
These jurisdictions are:
CALIFORNIA ILLINOIS NEBRASKA
CONNECTICUT LOUISIANA NEW YORK
III. CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF STATE COURT
SYSTEMS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
ALABAMA
Federal Rules Replica
Alabama abandoned its "modified system of common law pleading" 4 1
when the Alabama Supreme Court42 promulgated the Alabama Rules of
41. WRIHT I, supra note 1, § 9.1, at 46.
42. For background on the campaign leading to statutory conferral in 1971 of rule-making power on
the Alabama Supreme Court, see id.; Heflin, Remarks of the ChiefJustice, in Symposium, The Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 ALA. L. REv. 663, 663 (1973). The Alabama Supreme Court's rule-
making power is currently codified as ALA. CODE § 12-2-7(4) (1975).
1378
Vol. 61:1367, 1986
Federal Rules in State Courts
Civil Procedure.43 These rules replicate the Federal Rules and abolish the
"harsh rules of pleading" previously followed. 44 "The purpose of the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure is to effectjustice upon the merits of the
claim and to renounce the technicality of procedure."' 45 The Alabama
Rules are based "virtually verbatim" on the Federal Rules and cases
interpreting the FRCP are presumptively authoritative in construing their
Alabama counterparts. 46
43. The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated on January 3, 1973, to take effect on
July 3, 1973. For the text of the rules, see 23 ALA. CODE (1984).
44. Williams v. Kasal, 429 So. 2d 1008, 1010 (Ala. 1983) (citing B &M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376
So. 2d 667 (Ala. 1979)).
45. Crawford v. Crawford, 349 So. 2d 65, 66 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
46. Exparte Duncan Constr. Co., 460 So. 2d 852, 854 n.1 (Ala. 1984) (quoting Assured Investors
Life Ins. Co. v. National Union Associates, Inc., 362 So. 2d 228,231 (Ala. 1978)); see also Exparte
Scott, 414 So. 2d 939,941 (Ala. 1982); Bracy v. Sippial Elec. Co., 379 So. 2d 582,584 (Ala. 1980). See
generally Committee Comments to ALA. R. Civ. P. 1, 23 ALA. CODE, at I I ("It has long been settled in
this state that when the legislature adopts a federal statute or the statute of another state, it adopts also
the construction which the courts of such jurisdiction have placed on the statute. [Citations omitted.]
These rules represent an adaptation to the Alabama practice of rules of civil procedure already adopted
for the federal courts and by many states.").
Alabama has expressly adopted the federal conception of notice pleading set forth in Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), which held that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief." Dunson v. Friedlander Realty Co., 369 So. 2d 792, 796 (Ala.
1979). In Simpson v. Jones, 460 So. 2d 1282, 1283, 1285 (Ala. 1984), the Alabama Supreme Court was
careful to cite with approval both FriedlanderRealty and Crawford v. Crawford, 349 So. 2d 65, 66 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1977) (purpose of Alabama Rules is to renounce technicality of procedure), before holding
that "a document entitled 'Contest of Will"' was not a complaint sufficient to commence an action
under the special provisions of the Alabama statute of wills and its limitations period.
For comparison of Alabama's joinder and discovery provisions to the Federal Rules, see Futrell, The
New Rules andFederalDiscovery Practice, 25 ALA. L. REv. 759 (1973) (noting "close similarity to the
corresponding federal discovery rules"); Hoff, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under the Alabama Rules
of Civil Procedure, 25 ALA. L. REv. 667 (1973). Among other minor discrepancies, Alabama'sjoinder
rules differ from their federal counterparts in that counterclaims are not compulsory if the defense of the
original claim is controlled by a liability insurer, Alabama Civil Rule 13(a)(3), and in making
compulsory a plaintiff's claim against an impleaded third-party defendant under Alabama Civil Rule
14(a). See Hoff, supra, at 673, 693; see also 4 CuM.-SAm. L. REv. 207 (1973); cf infra note 316 (similar
qualifications of compulsory counterclaim rule in Rhode Island).
Alabama's summary judgment practice is subject to a quirk of as yet indefinite importance. Although
Alabama Civil Rule 56 tracks FRCP 56 virtually word for word, the Committee Comments noted that it
was subject to the preservation of Alabama's "scintilla evidence rule" by Alabama Civil Rule 50(e).
Committee Comments, Rules 50 and 56, 23 ALA. CODE, at 262-64, 310-11. Thus far, it is an
unanswered question whether "'a scintilla of evidence' is really different from 'substantial evidence."'
Hoffman, Pretrial Motion Practice Under the Alabana Rules of CivilProcedure, 25 ALA. L. REv. 709,
731 n.88 (1973). Foran interesting illustration of what the Supreme Court of Alabama does and does not
consider to be a "scintilla" of evidence in the context of an alleged spiderbite, see Wilbanks v. Hartselle
Hospital, Inc., 334 So. 2d 870, 872-73 (Ala. 1976) (affirming the granting of summary judgment in
favor of defendant after plaintiff's jury verdict in an earlier trial on the same evidence had been set aside
by the granting of a motion for new trial).
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ALASKA
Federal Rules Replica
Alaska's Rules of Civil Procedure have replicated the FRCP
sincel963. 47 Before attaining statehood in 1959, Alaska had an idio-
syncratic system of civil procedure. 48 A drafting error in the Alaska
Statehood Act 49 accelerated the transition period from a territorial court
system to the new state court system. 50 When a Federal District Court was
established for Alaska on February 20, 1960,51 Alaska's new state court
system became fully responsible for matters that territorial and interim
courts had formerly handled. 52
Three years of confusion ensued as the state courts operated under an
amalgam of traditional territorial practice and the incomplete set of interim
rules of procedure promulgated in great haste to meet the February 20,
1960, deadline.53 The confusion ended in 1963 when the Alaska Supreme
Court54 promulgated the Alaska Rules of Court Procedure and Administra-
tion, including Rules of Civil Procedure that follow the FRCP "in their
entirety including most of the numbering systems, except for minor
changes made to adapt them to the Alaska state situation." 55 Federal
decisional law is persuasive authority in the interpretation of Alaska's
analogues to the Federal Rules. 56
47. The Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure may be found in 2 ALASKA RULES OF CouRT, at CR 3-CR
283.
48. See Compiled Laws of Alaska containing the General Laws of the Territory of Alaska,
§§ 55-1-1 to 55-11-86 (1949) (superseded-"Civil Actions Generally"). Under this antecedent system
of procedure, demurrers were used and pleading was a highly technical enterprise. See id. §§ 55-5-1 to
55-5-19 (general pleading provisions). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Alaska code
coexisted in a confused state of affairs that was not conclusively resolved until after statehood when the
Supreme Court of Alaska adopted the current replica of the Federal Rules. See generally Nesbett,
Dimond & Arend, Foreword to ALASKA RULES OF COURT PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION (1963).
49. Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 12(b)(e), 72 Stat. 339, 348 (1958).
50. See Nesbett, Dimond & Arend, supra note 48. See generally Hobbs v. State, 359 P.2d 956
(Alaska 1961).
51. Exec. Order No. 10,867, 3 C.F.R. 401 (1959-1963).
52. Alaska Administrative Director of Courts, Alaska Court System Reports 1-2, 1960-63, at
45-47 (1963).
53. See Nesbett, Dimond & Arend, supra note 48.
54. The Alaska Supreme Court has constitutional rule-making power, subject to legislative
override by two-thirds vote. ALASKA CONST. art IV, §15.
55. Nesbett, Dimond & Arend, supra note 48. Alaska's joinder and discovery rules have been
revised to conform closely to the Federal Rules as amended through 1970.
56. See Drickersen v. Drickersen, 546 P.2d 162, 167 n.9 (Alaska 1976); Fenner v. Basset, 412 P.2d
318, 321 (Alaska 1966).
Alaska has enthusiastically embraced the federal philosophy of notice pleading. See Martin v. Mears,
602 P.2d 421,427 (Alaska 1979); Schaible v. Fairbanks Medical & Surgical Clinic, Inc., 531 P.2d 1252,
1255-57 (Alaska 1975) (following Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)); Dworkin v. First Nat'l Bank,
444 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Alaska 1968).
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ARIZONA
Federal Rules Replica
Arizona, previously a code pleading state,57 became the first FRCP
convert when, in 1940, the Arizona Supreme Court promulgated a pro
cedural system replicating the Federal Rules. 58 The current Rules of Civil
Procedure for the Superior Courts of Arizona took effect January 1, 1956. 59
They continue to replicate the Federal Rules. 60 In construing their own
rules, Arizona courts give great weight to federal construction of the
FRCp.61
ARKANSAS
Fact Pleading/Federal-Rules-Model Procedural System
Arkansas has a federally modelled procedural system with two non-
standard features that bar it from federal replica status. The Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure took effect in 1979 by order of the Arkansas Supreme
Court,62 replacing a predominantly code-pleading system63 which in-
57. See ARIZ. REv. CODE § 3746 (1928) (superseded codification compiled by F.C. Struckmeyer,
Code Commissioner; cited section required "concise statement of the cause of action" in complaint).
58. The Arizona Supreme Court had statutory authority to promulgate the rules. 1939 ARIZ. CODE
ANN. §§ 19-202 to 19-204 (Bobbs-Merrill 1940) (superseded). From the start the Arizona Rules were
essentially the Federal Rules changed in a few instances to suit local conditions. They bore section
numbers in the 1939 Code, but were also identified by rule number in brackets at the end of each
provision. See, e.g., 1939 ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 21-404 (Bobbs-Merrill 1940) (requiring complaint to
contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief");
§ 21-201 (stating that the "rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action"). See also 1939 ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 21-201 (Bobbs-Merrill 1940)
(compiler's note stating codified rules are in substance the FRCP and that they supersede conflicting
code provisions). See generally Sunderland, Arizona's New Rules of Civil Procedure Effect Conformity
with Federal Rules, 23 J. AM. Ju. Soc'y 215 (1940).
The Arizona Supreme Court's rule-making power is currently codified as ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-109 (1982).
59. See ARIZONA RuLEs OF CouRT, 3-61 (West 1985) (text of Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure for
the Superior Courts of Arizona).
60. See generally Hink, JudicialReform in Arizona-Administration of the Courts, 6 ARIz. L. REv.
13, 22 (1964) (author contending that adoption of FRCP based rules was one of many elements of
judicial reform that helped Arizona keep pace with increased litigation accompanying its change from
rural to well populated state).
Arizona's joinder and discovery rules have not only kept pace with the Federal Rules amendments of
1966 and 1970, but conform unusually closely to the 1980 and 1983 amendments as well.
"Arizona is a notice pleading state." Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 124
Ariz. 417, 604 P.2d 1128, 1134 (1979). Arizona's test for the sufficiency of a complaint expressly follows
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Long v. Arizona Portland Cement Co., 89 Ariz. 366, 362 P.2d
741, 742 (1961); Folk v. City of Phoenix, 27 Ariz. App. 146, 551 P.2d 595, 600 (1976).
61. See Edwards v. Young, 107 Ariz. 283, 486 P.2d 181 (1971).
62. The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure on December 18,
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cluded some of the reforms pioneered by the Federal Rules. 64 The Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure generally follow the FRCP 65 except in two
important respects. Arkansas has preserved its separate systems of law and
equity courts, 66 and has "deliberately rejected" notice pleading. 67
1978, pursuant to Act 38 of 1973 and to the court's constitutional authority to regulate court procedure.
The rules took effect on July 1, 1979, and superseded prior conflicting code sections. See ARK. REV.
STAT. ANN., Rules of Court (Bobbs-Merrill 1979 Replacement) (containing Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure). For scholarly comment on the change, see Cox & Newbern, New Civil Procedure: The
Court That Came in From the Code, 33 ARK. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979) (rule-by-rule comparison of FRCP and
new Arkansas Rules).
63. See, e.g., May v. Edwards, 258 Ark. 871, 529 S.W.2d 647, 650 (1975) (pre-rules Arkansas
decision holding that "[allthough a complaint must state facts constituting a cause of action as
something more than mere conclusions, when considered on demurrer, it is sufficient if they are stated
according to their legal effect, without stating the evidence of facts alleged.").
64. See WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.4, at 48.
65. For examples of Arkansas courts construing the Arkansas rules in light of federal precedent,
see Joey Brown Interest, Inc. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 284 Ark. 418, 683 S.W.2d 601, 604 (1985)
(Rule 56); Bailey v. Matthews, 279 Ark. 117, 649 S.W.2d 175, 176 (1983) (Rule 15(b)).
The Arkansas counterpart to FRCP 23 is considerably abbreviated, and has no requirement of
mandatory notice. The Arkansas condensation of FRCP 23 does not otherwise seem to differ substan-
tively from the federal template. See Cox & Newbern, supra note 62, at 37-38.
66. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action'. Actions
in equity shall be brought in the Chancery Court and actions at law shall be brought in the Circuit
Court."); id. reporter's notes ("As in the Federal Rules and code pleading, the intent here is to obviate
the 'forms of action'. . . . The second sentence makes clear the intent to preserve the distinction
between law and equity cases."); see also Cox & Newbern, supra note 62, at 9 (attributing continued
distinction between law and equity to fact that important substantive differences, such as the right to
jury trial, exist between law and equity).
67. Harvey v. Eastman Kodak Co., 261 Ark. 783, 610 S.W.2d 582, 584 (1981).
Although the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure do not refer to the pleading of a "cause of action"and
replace the demurrer with the motion to dismiss, ARK. R. Civ. P. 7(c), 12(b)(6), they require the
pleading of a claim for relief to consist of a statement "in ordinary and concise language of facts
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." ARK. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The counterpart language of
FRCP 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief," and avoids any reference to stating "facts."
The reference to "facts" in Arkansas Civil Rule 8(a)(1) is important in light of the significance of
"fact" pleading to the code scheme, see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text, and the Federal
Rules' conspicuous omission of any reference to the pleading of "facts" as opposed to a "claim for
relief." See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See also Cox & Newbern, supra note 62, at 20 (noting that the
Arkansas Supreme Court substituted the word "facts" for the Committee's "the claim" and that "[o]nly
time will tell how crucial that change may be."); id. at 25 (noting the corresponding difference between
the FRCP 12(b)(6) and the Arkansas Civil Rules 12(b)(6) motions).
In 1981 the Arkansas Supreme Court declared that it had "'deliberately rejected" the language of
FRCP 8(a)(2) and "what is commonly known as 'notice pleading'." Harvey v. Eastman Kodak Co., 261
Ark. 783, 610 S.W.2d 582, 584 (1981) (affirming dismissal under Arkansas Civil Rule 12(b)(6) of
complaint that alleged "negligence" of defendant without alleging the facts alleged to constitute
negligent conduct). Although the Harvey opinion seemingly "resurrects code pleading" it provides no
elaboration of the standard of factual specificity Arkansas courts demand of a civil pleading. Brill,
Harvey v. Eastman Kodak Company: Faculty Note, 34 ARK. L. REV. 722,725 (1981). Until further case
law accumulates construing Arkansas Civil Rule 8(a)(1), Arkansas' procedural system defies more
precise classification.
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CALIFORNIA
Fact Pleading/Code-Based Procedural System
California pioneered code pleading in the western states,68 and, although
it has imported many features of the Federal Rules,69 California remains
committed to code pleading. California practice follows its own terminolo-
gy even when the devices and procedures in question mimic practice under
the Federal Rules. 70 In the crucial area of standards for pleading the
differences are not merely semantic. 71 In California, a properly pleaded
civil complaint must contain "[a] statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action, in ordinary and concise language." 72 Although modern
decisions tend to espouse notice pleading, 73 demurrers addressed to the
style of pleading74 and precedents that squint for iltimate facts75 continue
to characterize California procedure.76
68. See WRGrr I, supra note 1, § 9.5, at 48 (California's version of Field Code adopted 1851).
69. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 387(b) (West Supp. 1986) (providing for intervention as of
right modeled on FRCP 24(a)); CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016-2034 (West 1983) (discovery provi-
sions modeled on FRCP 5, 26-37 & 45); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1781 (West 1985) (consumer class action
provisions modeled on FRCP 23).
70. "The pleadings allowed in [California] civil actions are complaints, demurrers, answers, and
cross-complaints." CAL. Cirv. PROC. CODE § 422.10 (West 1973). Note the absence of the term
"counterclaim," use of which was abolished in 1972. Claims by a defendant against a plaintiff are now
officially denominated "cross-complaints." Id. § 428.80. California's compulsory cross-complaint
rule features a transactional relationship test drawn virtually verbatim from FRCP 13(a). See id.
§9 426.10(c), 426.30(a).
71. In traditional code-pleading fashion California authorizes a demurrer when "[t]he pleading
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action," CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 430.10(e) (West
Supp. 1986), and California's general demurrer is by no means toothless. See, e.g., Logan v. Southern
Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 136 Cal. App. 3d 125,127, 185 Cal. Rptr. 878,884 (1982) (fired municipalbus
driver's allegation that termination hearing violated due process was a demurrable legal conclusion;
"complaint must allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts or conclusions of law"). See generally
Note, Fact Pleading vs. Notice Pleading: The Eternal Debate, 22 Loy. L. REv. 47, 58-61 (1976)
(discussing the distinction between the code pleading concept of a "cause of action" and the Federal
Rules' concept of a "claim for relief").
72. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10(a) (West Supp. 1986).
73. The California Court of Appeal has held that "the actionable facts relied on [must be stated]
with sufficient precision to inform the defendant of what plaintiff is complaining about .. "Signal
Hill Aviation Co., Inc. v. Stroppe, 96 Cal. App. 3d 627, 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 178, 183 (1979); see also
Perkins v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 1, 172 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1981) (trial court abused discretion by
granting motion to strike certain phrases in complaint on ground they left "ultimate facts" to
speculation; complaint was sufficient because it provided notice to defendants of "precise" claims
against them). Butcf. Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal. 3d 197,
212,673 P.2d 660,669, 197 Cal. Rptr. 783,792 (1983) ("Mhe complaint should set forth the ultimate
facts constituting the cause of action, not the evidence by which the plaintiff proposes to prove those
facts").
In Dino, Inc. v. Boreta Enters., 226 Cal. App.2d 336, 340, 38 Cal. Rptr. 167, 169 (1964), it sufficed
that "the pleading adequately gives notice" of a cause of action forunfair competition despite plaintiff's
pleading of the conclusion of law that its name had acquired a secondary meaning.
74. See, e.g., Drake v. Morris Plan Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 208,125 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1975) (pleading
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COLORADO
Federal Rules Replica
Colorado was one of the more progressive code pleading jurisdictions
when the Federal Rules went into effect. 77 True to this heritage, the
Colorado Supreme Court adopted in 1941 the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure. 78 These rules replicated the numbering and substance of the
in the alternative is demurrable "and it is no answer to an objection to say that, if either of the averments
[of fact] is true, a cause of action is stated") (dicta). See generally 49 CAL. JUR. 3D., PLEADING, § 51
(Bancroft-Whitney 1979) (pleading in alternative not permitted and subject to special demurrer as
opponent is entitled to distinct statement of facts claimed by pleader to exist).
75. The "ultimate fact" precedents, see supra notes 71 and 73, stand curiously intact despite
California's century-old statutory directive to construe pleadings liberally "with a view to substantial
justice between the parties." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 452 (West 1973) (originally enacted in 1872).
76. California experimented with federal-style pleading rules in selected trial courts pursuant to a
pilot project of "procedural innovations to reduce the cost of civil litigation" through experimental
"'pleading, pretrial and trial procedures. " CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1823 (West 1983). The pilot project
was in effect from January 1, 1978, until July 1, 1983, when it expired of its own force and was
superseded by permanent amendments to California's code respecting actions in California's trial
courts of inferior jurisdiction. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 90-100 (West. 1982). See generally
Stevens, The Economical Litigation Rules: The Municipal Courts Enter a New Era, SAN FRANCISCO
ATT'y, June-July 1983, at 17.
Along with constraints on discovery and numerous other experimental innovations the pilot project
sought to simplify pleading by requiring the pleading of "a claim for relief" to "contain a short and
plain statement of the occurrence or transaction upon which it is based showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief," CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1824. 1(b) (West 1983), and by abolishing demurrers except
"on the ground of a jurisdictional defect or on the ground that the complaint does not give notice of a
claim upon which relief can be granted." Id § 1825.5.
In its final report on the Economical Litigation Project, the California Judicial Council declared:
"This simplified pleading aspect of the project did not attain the desired goals of simplicity or
economy." JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 15. Among other problems,
"attorneys were confused and frustrated by the need to follow a different set of rules in ELP courts; as a
result, adherence to the project rules was often poor." Id. at 16. In addition, it was inconsistent with the
federal model of civil procedure, taken as a whole, to combine the oil of notice pleading with the water
of diluted rights to discovery. See Note, California's Pilot Project in Economical Litigation, 53 So.
CAL. L. REV. 1497, 15 10 n.84 (1980). The pilot project's restrictions on the normal scope of discovery
were a major grievance of defense counsel. "Defense attorneys believed that lack of discovery had
impeded their efforts to defend their clients and led to their perception of a lower quality ofjustice under
ELP." JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 16. The legislative response in
California was to abandon the experiment with notice pleading and to retain restrictions on discovery,
albeit in less "heavy-handed" form. Id.; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 92, 94 (West Cum. Supp.
1986).
77. "The [federal] rules in general provide for simplified and concise pleadings, and permit service
of process by individuals, all very much in conformity with our [Colorado] code." Moore, Shall
Colorado Procedure Conform With the Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 15 DICTA 5, 7
(1938).
78. See generally WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.6, at 49 (inherent rule-making power of Colorado
Supreme Court confirmed by statute). See also Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 108 Colo. 538, 120 P.2d
641 (1941) (former code of civil procedure effective until April 6, 1941).
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FRCP, 79 as do the current rules adopted in 1970.80 Construction of the
FRCP by federal courts is persuasive authority for the interpretation of the
state rules. 81
CONNECTICUT
Fact PleadinglCode-Based Procedural System
Connecticut has been a code pleading state since 1879.82 Pleading has
been simplified by the Connecticut Practice Book,83 which contains "a
multitude of simple forms and has contributed largely to a lack of tech-
nicality of pleading in that state."' 84 However, Connecticut pleading still
requires a complaint to contain a tatement of "the facts constituting the
cause of action,"' 85 and demurrers remain codified, 86 if not judicially
79. See Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959) (Colorado Rules patterned
after Federal Rules); Van Cise, The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 527,
541 (1951) ("[Colorado] Rules I to 84 in the main follow the Federal Rules").
The Colorado Rules were popular with bench and bar from their inception. See DeSouchet,
Pleadings andMotions: Rules 7-16, 23 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 542,551 (1951). The author concluded his
ten year review of cases applying the new rules with this comment:
From the foregoing cases decided during the first ten years of our Rules, it is apparent that the
Supreme Court, with few exceptions, has construed the rules with the liberality expected. The
experiment, if such it was, has proven successful. The merit of the Rules has been amply
demonstrated to warrant their retention. To rescind them would be unthinkable.
Id.
80. See 7A COLO. REV. STAT. Rules of Civil Procedure (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1985). Colorado's
Rules of Civil Procedure contain additional rules covering matters of local practice. In other respects,
the Colorado rules conform to the Federal Rules as amended in 1966 and 1970 but most subsequent
federal amendments have not been adopted. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 11, 16, 26, 30, 33, 34, 37,
52 (unrevised to reflect 1980 and 1983 amendments to Federal Rules). But cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 5
(tracking in substance 1980 amendment to FRCP 5); COLO. REv. STAT. § 26.1 (creating alternative
procedures for limited and simplified discovery upon motion of a party).
Colorado has embraced the federal concept of notice pleading. Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157, 162
(Colo. 1972); DiChellis v. Peterson Chiropractic Clinic, 630 P.2d 103, 105 (Colo. App. 1981).
81. See United Bank of Denver Nat'l Ass'n v. Shavlik, 541 P.2d 317, 318 (Colo. 1975); Duran v.
Lamm, 701 P.2d 609, 613 (Colo. App. 1984).
82. See Wiorrr I, supra note 1, § 9.7, at 50; see also State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501,353 A.2d
723, 742 (1974) (Cbogdanski, J., dissenting) (discussing Practice Act of 1879). For the current
Connecticut statutory provisions regulating civil practice and procedure, see CoNr. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 52-1 to 52-608 (West 1960).
83. CoNNETccrr PRACTICE BOOK (1983). See generally Costas, Book Review, 54 CONN. B.J. 80
(1980) (reviewing CoNNE icuT PRACTIcE: PRACTICE BOOK ANNOTATED (W. Moller, W. Horton, J. Kaye
& W. Effron eds., 2d ed. 1979)); Jennings, The New Practice Book, 25 CONN. B.J. 117, 117-22 (1951).
84. D. LOuisELL, G. HAZARD & C. TArr, CASES AND MATEMALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE,
STATE AND FEDERAL 92 (1983).
85. CONN. GEN. STAT. Ar. § 52-91 (West 1960, 1986 Cum. Supp.). A prior provision, section
52-98, repealed in 1978 by 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 379, provided that "[ejach pleading shall contain a
plain and concise statement of the material facts. . . but not of the evidence by which they are to be
proved." Id. § 52-98. The modem provision retains fact pleading terminology, as does Connecticut
Practice Book section 108. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 194 Conn. 312, 481 A.2d 31, 36 & n.13 (1984)
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recognized. 87 The Connecticut legislature has repealed many outmoded
code pleading provisions, 88 but the extent of its authority to prescribe
procedural rules for Connecticut courts is limited, to an as yet undefined
degree, by the separation of powers principles of the state constitution. 89
DELAWARE
Fact Pleading/Federal-Rules-Model Procedural System
Delaware retains its separate systems of common law and equity courts.
In 1948, Delaware abandoned an essentially common law procedural
system9" in favor of rules for each court system generally modeled on the
FRCP.91 Federal precedent construing the Federal Rules is "very per-
(Practice Book section 108 and "the spirit of our rules" require "full disclosure of all material facts");
Rodriguez v. Mallory Battery Co., 188 Conn. 145, 448 A.2d 829, 830 n.l (1982) (quoting Practice
Book section 108 in full). Another recent case collects extensive Connecticut authority for the
proposition that the "plaintiff's right to recover.., is limited by the allegations of his complaint and a
plaintiff, therefore, cannot recover for a cause of action which has not been properly pleaded." Selby v.
Pelletier, I Conn. App. 320, 472 A.2d 1285, 1287 n.2 (1984) (citations omitted). The Connecticut
Supreme Court has emphatically refused to
make the filing ofa complaint in our procedure serve merely as notice of an intent to investigate the
cause of an injury rather than as 'a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the
pleader relies' to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Practice Book §§ 108, 131. Such a result would
extend the effect of our liberal pleading rules far beyond the policy supporting them.
Dreier v. Upjohn Co., 196 Conn. 242, 492 A.2d 164, 168 (1985).
86. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-92 (West 1960) (providing that "[e]ach demurrer shall
distinctly specify the reason or reasons why the pleading demurred to is insufficient").
87. Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer, 179 Conn. 541, 427 A.2d 822, 825 (1980)
("[t]he motion to strike.., replaced the demurrer in our practice."); accord Mingachos v. CBS, Inc.,
196 Conn. 91, 491 A.2d 368, 379 (1985).
88. See Public Act No. 78-379, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 837 (Reg. Sess.) (effective July 1, 1978)
(repealing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-93 through 52-96, 52-100, 52-113, 52-124, and 52-125).
89. See State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 353 A.2d 723, 729 (1974) (statutory discovery provision
giving criminal accused right to obtain from prosecution statements by prosecution witnesses related to
the subject matter of the testimony of those witnesses violative of separation of powers mandated by
CONN. CONST. art. II under following test: "To be unconstitutional in this context, a statute must not
only deal with subject matter which is within the judicial power, but it must operate in an area which lies
exclusively under the control of the courts."); see also Note, Court Rule-Making in Connecticut
Revisited-Three Recent Decisions: State v. King, Steadwell v. Warden and State v. Canady, 16 CONN.
L. REv. 121 (1983) (post-Clemente cases' failure to delineate the boundaries of the Connecticut
judiciary's power to regulate procedure has led to the implicit overruling of statutes conflicting with
Practice Book provisions even in procedural areas impacting upon substantive rights and has threatened
a violation of separation of powers via the judiciary's encroachment upon the legislature's authority).
90. See generally 1935 REVISED CODE OF DELAWARE §§ 4643-4708 (1936) (superseded).
91. WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.8, at 51. The Rules ofthe Court ofChancery are printed in Volume
16 of the Delaware Code Annotated (Revised 1974) (1981 Replacement Volume & 1984 Cum. Supp.). In
the same volume are the Civil Rules Governing the Court of Common Pleas, which took effect in 1971,
see DEL. CT. C.P. Civ. R. 86, and govern proceedings in the Delaware common law courts of inferior
jurisdiction. The Rules of Civil Procedure for the Superior Court are printed in Volume 17 of the
Delaware Code Annotated (1975). All three sets of civil rules follow the numbering scheme and in
general the substance of the Federal Rules. The most significant differences are the inclusion of
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suasive" to Delaware courts' construction of their own rules. 92 Nonethe-
less, Delaware has not truly replicated the system of procedure embodied
by the Federal Rules. Like Arkansas, 93 Delaware's retention of separate
systems of common law and equity courts has been accompanied by
rejection of a general philosophy of notice pleading.94
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Federal Rules Replica
The local court system of the District of Columbia is a creature of federal
law. In creating and governing the District's local courts, Congress exer-
cised the "powers of a state" 95 pursuant to its "dual authority over the
District" 96 that it governs as both local and national sovereign.97
Until 1970, Congress provided the District with a dual system of courts
for the adjudication of local civil matters. 98 Sharing jurisdiction were
negligence in the matters to be pleaded with particularity under Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule
9(b) and Delaware Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 9(b), see WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.8, at 51,
and the omission of either a rule analogous to FRCP 23 or any other provision for class actions in the
rules governing the common law courts. Delaware Chancery Court Rules 23, 23.1 & 23.2 are virtually
identical to the analogous Federal Rules, however.
92. Allder v. Hudson, 48 Del. 489, 106 A.2d 769 (Super. Ct. 1954).
93. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
94. Unlike Arkansas, Delaware has adopted without change the language of FRCP 8(a)(2) making
"a short and plain statement of the claim" the standard of pleading specificity. See, e.g., DEL. SUPER.
Cr. Civ. R. 8(a)(l). But in giving effect to the inclusion of negligence among the matters to be pleaded
with particularity under Rule 9(b) of the rules governing proceedings in both the Superior Court and the
Court of Common Pleas, see supra note 91, Delaware courts have made clear that adoption of language
identical to Federal Rule 8(a) has not committed Delaware to notice pleading.
In Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Chesapeake Util. Corp., 436 A.2d 314, 338 (Del. 1981), the
Delaware Supreme Court declared that the purpose of Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b) "is to
apprise the adversary of the acts or omissions by which it is alleged that a duty has been violated" and
struck from a complaint allegations of parental negligence because the complaint failed "to allege facts
as to how the defendant parents failed to exercise proper power of control" and was "devoid of facts to
indicate a prior mischievous and reckless disposition of the defendant child and the parents' knowledge
thereof."
In the same case the Delaware Supreme Court also held that "the object of pleading is to reduce the
controversy to certain and precise issues of law or fact, on which, as containing the pretensions or
claims of the parties, the opinion of the court or jury may be taken." Id. Thus it is hardly surprising to
find the Delaware Superior Court granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a third-party complaint
seeking indemnification on a breach of contract theory. American Ins. Co. v. Material Transit, Inc., 446
A.2d 1101, 1104 (Del. Super. 1982). Even where Rule 9(b) does not specifically apply, the court held
that "[t]o show entitlement to relief as required in Rule 8(a), the complaint must aver either the
necessary elements of a cause of action or facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief under the
theory alleged." Id.
95. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 545 (1933).
96. Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428, 443 (1923).
97. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
98. See Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992-93 (D.C. 1979) (discussing abolition of dual court
system by enactment of District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970).
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"Article III" federal courts clothed with supplementary local jurisdiction
of a general nature99 and wholly local "Article I" courts of inferior
jurisdiction. 00 The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970101 established a unified local court system and
divested the District's "Article III" federal courts of their previously-
enjoyed jurisdiction over purely local matters. 102
Despite the confusing genealogy of the District's local court system, it is
clear that the adjudication of local civil matters has long proceeded accord-
ing to the Federal Rules themselves or a local replica. 103 The Rules of the
99. "The judgments of the [District's intermediate] appellate court, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, were subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit" and
[t]he United States District Court for the District had concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
General Sessions over most of the criminal and civil matters handled by that court . . . and had
exclusive jurisdiction over felony offenses, even though committed in violation of locally applica-
ble laws . . .. Thus, the District Court was filling the role of both a local and federal court.
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 392 n.2 (1972) (citations omitted).
For an analysis of the distinction between the "constitutional" federal courts authorized by Article III of
the Constitution and the "legislative" federal courts Congress may create pursuant to its powers under
Article I (and Article IV), see C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 11, at 39-52.
100. Before passage of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970, the local court system consisted of one appellate court and three trial courts, two of which, the
juvenile court and the tax court, were courts of special jurisdiction. The third trial court, the District of
Columbia Court of General Sessions, was one of quite limited jurisdiction, its criminal jurisdiction
consisting solely of that exercised concurrently with the United States District Court over misde-
meanors and petty offenses. The court's civil jurisdiction was restricted to cases where the amount in
controversy did not exceed $10,000, and it had jurisdiction over cases involving title to real property
only as part of a divorce action. Id. (citations omitted).
101. Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1971).
102. See Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1979); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 9, § 3508, at 30-31 (1984).
103. In 1928 Judge Clark classified the District of Columbia as a jurisdiction with a common law
system of civil procedure. CLARK I, supra note 7, § 8, at 21. The 1942 act creating the Municipal Court
for the District of Columbia provided that the court's rules of civil procedure "shall conform as nearly as
may be practicable to the forms, practice, and procedure now obtaining under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." D.C. CODE § 11-756(b) (Supp. 1943) (superseded), Act of April 1, 1942, 56 Stat. 193, ch.
207. See generally Klepinger v. Rhodes, 140 F.2d 697, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1944). Though the name of the
Municipal Court for the District of Columbia was changed to the District of Columbia Court of General
Sessions by D.C. CODE § 11-751(a) (1961), this court of limited local jurisdiction continued to operate
under rules "conform[ing] as nearly as may be practicable to the forms, practice, and procedure
prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... " D.C. CODE ENYCL. § 13-101(a) (West
1966). See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 1012, at 69-70 (1969).
When the United States District Court for the District of Columbia formerly exercised local
jurisdiction, see supra note 99 and accompanying text, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied to
all such cases, FED. R. Civ. P. 81(d) (1938), except probate, adoption, and lunacy proceedings. FED. R.
Civ. P. 81(a) (1938). The 1938 text of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appears in 308 U.S.
765. FRCP 8 1(a) was amended in 1966 to exclude only "mental health proceedings in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia," see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 1022, at
105-06, and this exclusion has become moot with the abrogation of the local jurisdiction of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the District's present day court
of general jurisdiction, replicate the FRCP in virtually all respects.'°4
Federal case law is persuasive authority in interpreting the counterpart
District of Columbia rules. 10 5
FLORIDA
Fact Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System
Florida is procedurally idiosyncratic. 0 6 The Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure 10 7 abolish the distinction between actions at law and suits in
equity 10 8 and generally follow the order of their FRCP counterparts, but
differ in numbering scheme. A Florida pleading must contain "a short and
plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief," 09 and thus notice pleading is not authorized. 110 Florida has long
104. The February 1, 1971, Introductory Note to the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, D.
C. Cowtr RuLEs A'N. 191 (1985), declares that the rules seek "to provide an integral and convenient
rules structure modeled closely on that of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The Comments of the
Advisory Committee indicate precisely where variation from the language of the Federal Rules occurs
in the "federally-derived Superior Court Rules." Id.
105. See Goldkind v. Snider Bros., Inc., 467 A.2d 468,472 (D.C. 1983) ("when a local rule and a
federal rule are identical, . . . federal court decisions interpreting the federal rule are persuasive
authority in interpreting [the local rule]") (quoting Vale Properties, Ltd. v. Canterbury Tales, Inc., 431
A.2d 11, 13 n.3 (1981); see also Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union No. 730, 482 A.2d 801, 807
(D.C. 1984) (advisory committee note determines meaning of a federal rule and hence of counterpart
District of Columbia rule).
The District of Columbia follows the federal construction of Rule 8, In re Tyree, 493 A.2d 314, 317
(D.C. 1985), and the general philosophy of notice pleading. Scott v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d
319, 323 (D.C. 1985).
106. For the "unusually checkered history" of procedural reform in Florida, see WRIGHT I, supra
note 1, § 9.10, at 52; WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.10, at 40.
107. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967 Revision, were promulgated by the Supreme
Court of Florida on June 15, 1966, effective at year's end. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967
Revision, 187 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1966). As currently compiled, they may be found in FLORIDA RuLES OF
CouRT (West 1986).
The Supreme Court of Florida has had plenary constitutional rule-making powersince 1956. WRIGHT
I, supra note 1, § 9.13, at 53. A 1972 amendment re-enacted that power but made it subject to legislative
override by two-thirds vote of each house. FLA. CoNsr. art. 5, § 2. See In re Clarification of Fla. Rules
of Practice & Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973). See generally Means, The Power to Regulate
Practice and Procedure in Florida Courts, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 442 (1980) (arguing that Florida
Supreme Court has erroneously held legislature lacks concurrent rule-making power under Florida
constitution). But see Parness, The Legislative Roles in Florida's Judicial Rulemaking, 33 U. FLA. L.
Rav. 359 (1981) (criticizing on other grounds Florida Supreme Court's method of exercising its rule-
making power).
108. See FLA. R. Ctv. P. 1.040. Professor Wright considers the merger of law and equity the
"principal achievement" of the 1967 Florida Rules. WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.10, at 40.
109. FLA. R. Civ. P. l.l10(b)(2).
110. Some decisions of the Florida District Courts of Appeal have construed the "ultimate facts"
language of Florida Rule 1. 110(b)(2) as if it were just a gloss on the notice pleading standard of FRCP
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abjured "demurrers,"' but the motion to dismiss for "failure to state a
cause of action" 112 remains as a functional equivalent. Florida's rules for
8(a)(2). In Brown v. Gardens by the Sea S. Condominium Ass'n, 424 So. 2d 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983). the court stated:
Florida uses what is commonly considered as a notice pleading concept and it is a fundamental rule
that the claims and ultimate facts supporting same must be alleged. The reason for the rule is to
appraise [sic] the other party of the nature of the contentions that he will be called upon to meet,
and to enable the court to decide whether same are sufficient.
Id. at 183. This statement seems contradictory in that it calls for pleading of "ultimate facts," as the rule
does, yet labels the process one of "notice pleading." Cf. River Road Constr. Co. v. Ring Power Corp.,
454 So. 2d 38, 41, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam) (complaint seeking attorney's fees in ad
damnum insufficient to authorize admission of unpleaded attorney's fees agreement "where the
complaint had failed to state any basis for entitlement to such fees").
Similar confusion is shown by Martin v. Highway Equip. Supply Co., 172 So. 2d 246,247 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1965), in which the court compared the Florida rule authorizing dismissal for failure to state a
cause of action to its federal counterpart. The court stated that the "language of the federal rule is
nothing more or less than the definition of a cause of action. Both rules mean the same." In fact, FRCP
12(b)(6) refers to "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," while Florida Rule 1.140,
like its predecessor, Florida Rule 1.11 (repealed), refers to "failure to state a cause of action."
Another case endorsing a strange reading of the seemingly plain language of the Florida Rules is
Vantage View, Inc. v. Bali E. Dev. Corp., 421 So. 2d 728,730-733 & n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), in
which the court criticizes the Florida "Bench and Bar" for construing the "ultimate facts" requirement
as requiring greater detail in pleading than the standard of Conley v. Gibson. But the Fourth District has
also held in an easement case "that the easement is not sufficiently identified and that the complaint in
its present form fails to state a cause of action" despite the "careful delineation of the route and termini
of the claimed easement" because "width is an essential part of their description." Deseret Ranches of
Fla., Inc. v. Bowman, 340 So. 2d 1232, 1233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 349 So. 2d 155
(Fla. 1977) (interlocutory appeal on other grounds).
A panel of the First District Court of Appeal recently stated, in dicta, that the pleadings "stretch(ed]
'notice pleading' to its extreme limits." United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. J.D. Johnson Co., 438 So.
2d 917, 919 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Since the court also declared the pleadings to be "clearly
insufficient" and subject to dismissal had the appropriate motion been made, id., it apparently meant
that pleadings barely sufficient by notice pleading standards were obviously insufficient under the
stricter regime of Florida procedural law. More recently, the First District has demanded that a
complaint alleging "bare facts sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss without leave to amend" may
still be dismissed with leave to amend for failure to allege "sufficient ultimate facts." Frugoli v. Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
The Florida Supreme Court has neither advocated notice pleading nor exercised its powers to delete
the reference to "ultimate facts" from the Florida Rules. While Florida pleading policy has the liberal
ambition "to eliminate technicalities and simplify the procedures involved in the administration of
justice[,]" Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters, 246 So. 2d 563, 565 (Fla. 1971), Florida must be
regarded as a procedural system in transition that has not yet officially and systematically embraced
notice pleading.
111. 1954 Rule of Civil Procedure 1.7 (e) provided: "Demurrers, pleas, replication, rejoinder,
surrejoinder, rebutter, surrebutter, and other technical defensive pleadings . . . are abolished." This
rule was derived from 1950 Common Law Rule 8; its deletion from the modem rules "was a matter of
housecleaning" because such defensive pleadings were already abolished by former Rule 1.7(a)'s
phrase "No other pleading shall be allowed," which was incorporated into Florida Rule 1.100. In
Florida, demurrers are considered defensive pleadings. Barns & Mattis, 1962 Amendments to the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 276, 277-79 (1963).
112. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1. 140(b)(6). Note the semantic asymmetry inherent in a motion to dismiss
for "failure to state a cause of action" when Florida Rule 1. 110 requires a pleading to contain ultimate
facts showing entitlement to relief, not a "cause of action."
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joinder generally follow the model of the Federal Rules,I"3 and the Florida
rules relating to discovery 14 and summary judgment 15 are even more
closely patterned after the FRCP.116
113. Compare FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220 (class action rule virtually identical in structure and nearly
identical in text to FRCP 23) with FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.230 (intervention rule entirely permissive, without
provision for intervention as of right similar to FRCP 24(a)).
Florida third-party practice varies from the federal model, but the degree is uncertain in light of the
1984 amendment of Florida Rule 1.180(a), Florida's analogue to FRCP 14(a). The thrust of the
amendment appears to be to rectify partially Florida's lack of a broad joinder of claims provision
analogous to FRCP 18(a).
Florida Rule 1. 180(a) was amended by the Florida Supreme Court to "overrule" two decisions and to
"permit the defendant to have the same right to assert claims arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that all the other parties to the action have." See In re Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 458 So.
2d 245, 248 (Fla. 1984). The text of the rule was changed to read:
At any time after commencement of the action a defendant may have a summons and complaint
served on a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the defendant for all or part of
the plaintiff's claim against the defendant and may also assert any other claim that arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim.
Id. (emphasis added).
In one of the decisions prompting this reform, a Florida appellate court held that defendant
condominium owners could not join "third party defendants" to their warranty counterclaims in an
action in which they had been sued by the condominium developer for purely injunctive relief. Miramar
Constr., Inc. v. El Conquistador Condominium, 303 So. 2d 81, 81-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). It is
unclear whether the purported "overruling" of Miramar was meant to effect an incorporation of FRCP
13(h)'s liberal rule regarding the joinder of additional parties to existing cross- and counterclaims, or
whether subsequent interpretation will disclose that Miramar was overruled only to the extent that the
parties sought to be joined were necessary to accord complete relief in accordance with Florida Rule
1.170(h).
The other catalyst to the third-party practice reform was Richard's Paint Mfg. Co. v. Onyx Paints,
Inc., 363 So. 2d 596 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The court there held that, absent ajoinder of claims rule
similar to FRCP 18(a), former rule 1.180(a) prevented a wholesale paint dealer, as counter-defendant/
third-party complainant, from obtaining a greater monetary recovery from the third-party defendant
paint manufacturer than was sought in the counterclaim against it. Id. In overruling this case by
amendment, the Florida Supreme Court has authorized joinder of additional transactionally related
claims to indemnity claims by the original defendant against a third party defendant, even where the
aggregate amount of the relief sought against the third party defendant exceeds the amount sought from
the original defendant by the original plaintiff.
This result shows some convergence of Floridajoinder policy with that of the Federal Rules. See FED
R. Civ. P. 18(a) (freejoinder of claims against those who are already opposing parties). Whether Florida
has also moved toward the Federal position on permissive joinder of parties, see FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h),
20, is unclear pending interpretation of Florida Rule 1.180(a) as amended.
114. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280-1.380 (patterned closely on Federal Rules' discovery provisions as
amended in 1970). Florida's analogue to FRCP 32(a)(3)-Florida Rule 1.330(a)(3)-is subject to the
idiosyncratic provision of Florida Rule 1.390, permitting expert witness testimony to be adduced at trial
by deposition regardless of where the expert witness resides. With the exception of a provision
permitting telephonic depositions-Florida Rule 1.310(b)(7)-the Florida Rules have not been con-
formed to the federal discovery amendments of 1980 and 1983.
115. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510. Florida departs from practice under FRCP 56 by requiring a motion
for summary judgment to "state with particularity the grounds upon which it is based and the
substantial matters of law to be argued."
116. Florida courts frequently look to federal precedent and commentary as aids in interpretation
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GEORGIA
Notice Pleading/Federal Code Procedural System
The Georgia Civil Practice Act of 1966 extensively modernized
Georgia's civil procedure. 117 Although not identical in content to the
Federal Rules, Georgia's new code of procedure largely follows the
FRCP. 118 The Georgia courts have relied on federal precedent when con-
struing Georgia's codified analogues to the Federal Rules. 119 The new code
completely abandoned Georgia's amalgam of code and common law plead-
ing 120 in favor of the federal style of notice pleading. 12'
HAWAII
Federal Rules Replica
Since statehood in 1959, the Hawaii Supreme Court's Rules of Civil
Procedure have been replicas of the Federal Rules. 22 Their numbering is
identical and key rules follow the FRCP with only slight grammatical
of Florida's counterpart rules. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 432 So. 2d 704,706-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Wilson v. Clark, 414 So. 2d 526, 530 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
117. Georgia Civil Practice Act, No. 588, 1966 Ga. Laws 609 (codified at GA. CODE ANN., tit. 8IA,
§§ 81A-101-81A-185 (1984)) ("An Act to comprehensively and exhaustively revise, supersede, and
modernize pretrial, trial and certain post-trial procedures in civil cases .... ").
118. The sections of the Act were numbered to correspond to the Federal Rules. The following list
illustrates the degree and nature of Georgia's variation from federal practice. Although Georgia has
conformed its rules to the 1966 amendments to Federal Rules 19 and 24, it has not adopted the 1966
amendment to Federal Rule 23. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 81A-119, 81A-123, 8 IA-124. Georgia's version
of Rule 8 prevents a prayer for a sum certain in excess of $10,000 in a medical malpractice action. GA.
CODE ANN. § 81A-108(a)(2)(B). See generally Keese v. Brown, 250 Ga. 383, 297 S.E.2d 487 (1982).
Georgia's version of Rule 8(c) originally followed the Federal Rules in requiring the pleading of
assumption of risk and "comparative negligence" as affirmative defenses, 1966 Ga. Laws 609, 619, but
these defenses were removed from GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-108(c) by 1967 Ga. Laws 226, 230.
119. See Georgia Int'l Life Ins. Co. v. Boney, 139 Ga. App. 575, 228 S.E.2d 731, 737 (1976)
(acknowledging "persuasive rule of federal decisions"); Poole v. City of Atlanta, 117 Ga. App. 432, 160
S.E.2d 874, 875 (1968).
120. See WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.11, at 53.
121. See GA. CODE ANN. 81A- 108(a)(2)(A) ("short and plain statement of the claims showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief"); Sprewell v. Farmer, 230 Ga. 297, 196 S.E. 2d 866,868 (1973) (policy of
"notice pleadings now in force"); Byrd v. Ford Motor Co., 118 Ga. App. 333, 163 S. E.2d 327,327 (1968)
(new procedure "does away with 'issue pleading' and substitutes 'notice pleading').
122. See generally HAWAIi R. Civ. P. 1-85 (rev. ed. 1980, with further amendments through June,
1985), in 1 Rules of Court, The Judiciary of Hawaii (1968).
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variations. 123 Case law interpreting the federal counterparts to the Hawaii
Rules has been held to be "highly persuasive" authority in construing the
Hawaii Rules. 124
IDAHO
Notice Pleading/Federal-Rules-Model Procedural System
The 1958 Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure reorganized Idaho's procedural
system in the general form of the FRCP.125 At that time, Idaho's Rules and
its statutory procedural law coexisted in uneasy conflict; the indecisiveness
of both the Supreme Court and legislature as to whether the 1958 rules had
the effect of statutes led to the necessity of specific repeal 26 of many of the
conflicting statutory provisions' 27 in 1975. Until then, several Idaho Code
sections addressed the use, grounds and form of demurrers. 128 The 1975
repeal of the vestiges of code pleading was accompanied by the Supreme
Court of Idaho's comprehensive amendment of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, 129 which are now closely modeled on the Federal Rules 130 and
123. Hawaii Civil Rule 14(a) does contain an interesting addition to the text of its federal
counterpart: its first sentence permits a defendant to implead a party who may be liable "to him or to the
plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." Id. (emphasis supplied).
124. Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Hawaii 45,451 P.2d 814,824 (1969); see also Kalauli v. Lum, 57 Hawaii
168, 552 P.2d 355, 356 (1976) ("useful precedents"). In particular, Hawaii has embraced the federal
philosophy of "simplified notice pleading." Perry v. Planning Comm'n, 62 Hawaii 666, 619 P.2d 95,
108 (1980).
125. See IDAHO CODn, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (Bobbs-Merrill 1958) (superseded). These
rules took effect November 1, 1958, and were amended comprehensively effective January 1, 1975. The
1958 rules followed the FRCP "as far as seemed practicable to the end of uniformity but not at the
expense of existing procedural statutory rules that seem to be better for state practice." Id. at iii
(publisher's note).
126. See, e.g., provisions in IDAHO COon § 5-601-5-619 (1979), concerning the repeal of demurrer
provisions.
127. See, e.g., 1958 IDAHO R. Crv. P. 7(c) annotation (conflicting prior code sections were
"probably abrogate[d]" in areas addressed by rule abolishing demurrers, pleas, and exceptions).
128. See, e.g., IDAHO COon §§ 5-603, 5-607, 5-608 (1948).
129. For the text of the current Idaho Rules, see IDAHO CODE, Idaho Court Rules (Bobbs-Merrill
1980 & 1984 Cum. Supp.).
130. The 1980 Idaho Court Rules volume of the Idaho Code, see supra note 129, contains
annotations comparing each rule to its federal counterpart.
A 1984 amendment to Idaho Rule 9(b) added "violation of civil or constitutional rights" to fraud and
mistake as matters to be pleaded with particularity. While this is consistent with the way some federal
courts have pretended the Federal Rules read, see infra note 38, it is a departure from the Federal Rules
as written.
As amended in 1984, Idaho Rule 4(i) contains an unusual provision for consent to personal
jurisdiction by "voluntary appearance," which seems to preclude the assertion of defenses under Idaho
Rule 12(b)(3), (4), or (5) by an answer amended as of right. For a similar example of idiosyncratic state
practice that we consider incompatible with federal replica status, see infra note 252 and accompanying
text (Nevada's special appearance rule). While Idaho's idiosyncrasy is explicit in the text of Idaho Rule
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are generally construed to like effect. 131
ILLINOIS
Fact Pleading/Code-Based Procedural System
Illinois resembles California in its retention of code pleading despite the
similarity of its code to the Federal Rules. 132 The new Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure 133 reorganized Illinois procedural law, but otherwise made only
stylistic rather than substantive changes. 134 "While notice pleading pre-
vails under the Federal rules," the Illinois Supreme Court has recently
observed, "a civil complaint in Illinois is required to plead the ultimate
facts which give rise to the cause of action." 135 An Illinois complaint must
contain a "plain and concise statement of the pleader's cause of action." 136
Bills of particulars have not been abolished 137 and although Illinois has
4(i), the lack of any cross-reference to Rule 4(i) in the text of Rule 12(h) creates the likelihood of waiver
by unwary assertion of the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in an answer rather than by
preliminary motion.
Although the matter is hardly free from doubt, these departures from the text and principles of the
Federal Rules seem sufficiently significant to tilt the balance against classification of Idaho's civil
procedural system as a federal replica.
131. See M.K. Transp. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345,612 P.2d 1192,1196 n.4 (1980); see also Lawrence
Warehouse Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 634, 637 (1965) (1958 Idaho Rules to be
construed to like effect as parallel Federal Rules "if such construction is reasonable"). For Idaho's
federal-style interpretation of notice pleading, see Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho
Dep't of Health & Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 683 P.2d 404, 406 (1984). See also Kolp v. Board of
Trustees, 102 Idaho 320, 629 P.2d 1153, 1161 (1981) ("[f]or over 20 years now we have had notice
pleadings") (Bistline, J., concurring and dissenting).
132. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
133. Act of Aug. 19, 1981, Public Act No. 82-280, 1982 Ill. Laws 1381. The rules became effective
July 1, 1982. See ILL. ANN. STAT. 110, §§ 2-101 to 2-1601 (Smith-Hurd 1983). These rules re-enacted the
former Civil Practice Act as Article II of the code, to be cited as the Civil Practice Law. Id.
134. Jenner, Tone & Martin, History, Source and Effect of the Civil Practice Laiv, ILL. ANN. STAT.
110 (volume containing §§ 1-101 to 2-502, at XI, XXXIII) (Smith-Hurd 1983).
135. People exrel. Scott v. College Hills Corp., 91Ill.2d 138,435 N.E.2d463,466-67(1982). The
court also stated that pleadings were to be liberally construed and that federal notice pleading precedent
was relevant to determine the adequacy of a civil complaint. Id. at 466,467. But as the court had said a
few months previously:
Notice pleading, as known in some jurisdictions, is not sufficient under our practice act . ...
[P]rovisions concerning liberal construction. . . do not remedy the failure of a complaint to state
a cause of action . . . .This court has repeatedly held that a complaint which does not allege
facts, the existence of which are necessary to enable a plaintiff to recover does not state a cause of
action and that such deficiency may not be cured by liberal construction or argument.'
Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Il1. 2d 407, 430 N.E.2d 976, 985-86 (1981) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added by court). For an illustration of the continued application of these principles after the
enactment of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure in 1982, see Spiegel v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 125 Il.
App. 3d 897, 466 N.E.2d 1040, 1042 (1984).
136. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-603(a) (Smith-Hurd 1983).
137. Id. § 2-607.
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borrowed many of the Federal Rules' joinder provisions 138 there is no
compulsory counterclaim rule in Illinois. 139
INDIANA
Federal Rules Replica
Indiana's use of code pleading1 40 ceased when the Indiana Rules of Trial
Procedure became effective on January 1, 1970.141 These rules are mod-
eled on the Federal Rules, contain many common provisions and generally
conform to the numbering and organization of their federal counterparts.
Indiana has wholeheartedly embraced notice pleading.142 Although the
Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure contain lengthy provisions unique to state
practice, they are not inconsistent with the philosophy of the Federal
Rules. 143 Interpretation of the Federal Rules guides construction of the
Indiana Rules. 144
IOWA
Notice PleadinglIdiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System
138. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-404,2-405 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (joinder of parties); § 2-406(b) (third-party
complaint for indemnity); § 2-408(a) (intervention as of right); § 2-408(b) (permissive intervention);
§ 2-409 (interpleader), §§ 2-801 to 2-806 (class actions).
139. Id. § 2-608(a) (Smith-Hurd 1983) (providing only for permissive counterclaims).
140. See WRIGHT I, supra note I, § 9.15, at 56.
141. The Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure may be found in the Court Rules (Civil) volume, 34 IND.
CODE ANN. App. (West 1981 & Supp. 1986). The adoption of comprehensive rules of civil procedure in
Indiana had a curious history. The Supreme Court of Indiana had both statutory and constitutional
authority to prescribe rules of procedure, but had failed to promulgate a complete set of rules. See
WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.15, at 56. The Indiana Legislature enacted the Indiana Rules of Civil
Procedure on March 13, 1969, to be effective on January 1, 1970. See 34 IND. CODE ANN. App. at III
(West 1981) (publisher's preface). The Indiana Supreme Court then adopted a similar but not identical
set of rules on July 29, 1969, also effective January 1, 1970.
The Indiana Supreme Court has since held that its procedural rules take precedence over conflicting
statutes, State ex rel. Gaston v. Gibson Circuit Court, 462 N.E.2d 1049, 1051 (Ind. 1984); Augustine v.
First Fed. Say. & L. Ass'n, 384 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (Ind. 1979), and indeed this was confirmed by the
very statute by which the Legislature enacted its rules of procedure. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-5-1-1
(enacting Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure) (repealed 1984) (West 1983 & 1986 Supp.); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-5-1-2 (West 1983) (reaffirming power of Indiana Supreme Court to "adopt, amend and
rescind rules of court affecting matters of procedure").
The Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure were formally adopted by the Legislature and incorporated into
the Indiana Code in 1984 by what appears to be wholly superfluous legislation. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-5-1-6 (West Supp. 1986). See Legislative Wrap-up, 27 Ras GESTAE 472, 474 (1984).
142. IND. R. TRIAL P. 8(A)(1). See Parker v. State, 400 N.E.2d 796, 798 (Ind. App. 1980); Farm
Bureau Ins. Co. v. Clinton, 149 Ind. App. 36, 269 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1971).
143. See, e.g., IND. R. TRIAL P. 13(J)-(M); 17(D)-(F); 19(C)-(F). But cf IND. R. TRIAL P. 23 (class
action rule follows verbatim FRCP 23).
144. See, e.g., Gumzv. Starke County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc., 271 Ind. 694,395 N.E.2d
257, 261, (1979); Penwell v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 474 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. App. 1985).
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Iowa's civil procedure is unusually difficult to classify, and has been for
years. 145 The Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, although adopted five years
after the Federal Rules, are organized and numbered quite differently.
Primarily because these rules continued to require "fact pleading," Pro-
fessor Wright declared that the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure were "really
very different" from the FRCP. That is not the case today, although
differences do remain to distinguish Iowa's civil procedure from that of the
federal courts.
Some of Iowa's rules have always resembled the Federal Rules,146 and
recent amendments have increased the overall similarity. 147 Iowa's counter-
part to the Federal Rule 12(e) motion for more definite statement is
grudgingly worded, 148 but Iowa has abolished common counts, fictions,
demurrers, general issues, and other technical forms of pleading. 1
49 Most
important, however, is Iowa's 1976 adoption of notice pleading by requir-
ing only a "short and plain statement of the claim." 150 In our view, the
unconventional organization and enumeration of Iowa's Rules of Civil
Procedure pale in significance when compared to these functional sim-
ilarities to the federal system. The idiosyncratic format of the Iowa Rules
145. See WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.16, at 56-57 (brief history of how the Iowa Rules of Civil
Procedure came to be engrafted upon the Field-type Code that Iowa had adopted in 1851, and a
description of their idiosyncrasy as of 1960).
146. See, e.g., IOWA R. Civ. P. 22-24 (joinder of claims and parties analogous to FRCP 18 & 20);
IOWA R. Civ. P. 29-30 (compulsory and permissive counterclaims analogous to FRCP 13(a) and 13(b)).
147. See, e.g., IOWA R. Civ. P. 33 (as amended 1976) (crossclaims authorized in terms virtually
identical to FRCP 13(g)); IowA R. Civ. P. 34 (adopted 1973) (third-party practice similar to FRCP 14);
IowA R. Civ. P. 88-90 (as amended 1976) (standards for amending complaints, the relation back of an
amended complaint, and standards for supplemental complaints, all patterned on FRCP 15); see also
IOWA R. Civ. P. 42.1-.20 (adopted 1980) (Iowa's version of Uniform Class Action Rules, generally
consistent with, although more comprehensive in scope, than FRCP 23).
148. Iowa Rule 112 provides thataparty "may move fora more specific statement of any matter not
pleaded with sufficient definiteness to enable him to plead to it and for no other purpose." (emphasis
added).
149. See IoWA R. Civ. P. 67.
150. See IowA R. Civ. P. 69(a). Oddly, Iowa did not adopt the provisions of FRCP 8 regarding the
pleading of defenses. See IOWA R. Civ. P. 72 (answer "must state any additional facts deemed to show a
defense"). However, Iowa case law makes clear that the 1976 amendment to Iowa Rule 69 adopted the
notice pleading philosophy of Federal Rule 8(a). See, e.g., Northrup v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 372
N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 1985) ("The standard by which the sufficiency of a pleading is measured is
whether it provides 'fair notice' of the claim asserted so as to allow the adverse party an opportunity to
make an adequate response."). See generally Lamantia v. Sojka, 298 N.W.2d 245, 247-49 (Iowa 1980)
("the concept of notice pleading" and use of summary judgment is "a necessary adjunct to notice
pleading, to eliminate sham claims and defenses") (emphasis added); Christensen v. Shelby County,
287 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Iowa 1980) (FRCP 8(a) is "persuasive in interpreting our rules"); Citizens for
Washington Square v. City of Davenport, 277 N.W.2d 882, 883-84 (Iowa 1979) (notice pleading
explicated in connection with Iowa Rule 104(b), analogous to FRCP 12(b)(6)); Sulzberger Excavating,
Inc. v. Glass, 351 N.W.2d 188, 192-93 (Iowa App. 1984) (rejecting "narrow view of notice pleading
concepts" and holding that notice pleading does not require that specific theories be pled and "does not
require the pleading of ultimate facts").
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bar their classification as a Federal-Rules-Model Procedural System, but in
content, Iowa's Rules and the Federal Rules have much in common. 151
KANSAS
Notice Pleading/Federal Code Procedural System
Shortly after Professor Wright's caustic appraisal of its nineteenth-
century procedural system in his 1960 survey, 152 Kansas adopted a new
Code of Civil Procedure in 1963153 that included a complete set of rules of
civil procedure "patterned in significant measure after the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. "154 Kansas courts have embraced notice pleading enthusi-
astically. 155 In enumeration and organization the codified Kansas rules of
civil procedure generally follow the Federal Rules, 156 with the insertion of
151. The functional similarity between Iowa's idiosyncratic procedural system and systems organ-
ized more obviously according to the model of the Federal Rules is due, in part, to Iowa's liberalization
of its rules regarding discovery. See lowA R. Ctv. P. 121-134. These rules, most of which were adopted
in 1973, follow closely the organization and terminology of FRCP 26-37 as amended in 1970. This was
a major change which foreshadowed and facilitated Iowa's conversion to notice pleading three years
later. Cf WRIGHTI, supra note 1, § 9.16, at 57 ("The [Iowa] discovery rules, even as recently revised [in
1957], are still substantially less liberal than the corresponding provisions of the federal rules.").
152. "Kansas procedure has not substantially changed since the adoption, in 1859, of a civil
practice act based on the Field Code. Federal Rule 16, providing for pre-trial conferences, has been
adopted by statute in Kansas, but this is virtually the only instance of incorporation there of modem
procedural ideas." WRiGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.17, at 57 (footnotes omitted).
The Kansas Judicial Council began studying the revision of the Kansas civil procedural system in
1959, before the publication of Professor Wright's survey in 1960, but the report of its advisory
committee was not completed until late in 1962. Gard, Highlights of the Kansas Code of Civil
Procedure, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 199, 199 (1963) (author was chair of advisory committee). Kansas'
adoption of the federal civil procedure model was encouraged by the "general feeling of satisfaction
with the practice under the federal rules" as "evidenced by the extensive adoption of federal procedure
in many of the states" and by the fact that "after twenty-five years of experience" there had accumulated
a "large volume of federal case precedent" to make "adaptation to the state practice much less difficult
than in the beginning." Id. at 204.
153. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-201-269 (1983). The new code's effective date was January 1,
1964. For text of the rules immediately following the change, see KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-201-269
(1976) (superseded). For a brief history of code pleading in Kansas, see Gard, Procedure by Court
Rules: Recapturing by the Courts of a Surrendered Authority, 5 U. KAN. L. REv. 42, 43 (1956).
154. For over one hundred years the Field Code and its patchwork amendments dominated Kansas
practice. Then with the enactment of Kan. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 303, which became effective Jan. 1,
1964, the legislature of Kansas laid down a completely new practice code patterned in significant
measure after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Shurtz, Civil Practice, 14 KAN. L. REv. 171, 171
(1965).
155. "The need for technical pleading has vanished. We now require only a barebones pleading
which outlines the nature of the claim. Since discovery in its broadest scope is available under the code
of civil procedure, there is no need for technical pleadings." Oller v. Kincheloe's, Inc., 235 Kan. 440,
681 P.2d 630, 636 (1984). "With the advent of present notice-type pleading more illiberal construction
should not be the order of the day .. "Monroe v. Daar, 520 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Kan. 1974) (opinion of
Commissioner) (citing federal authority as applicable to determine sufficiency of pleadings under new
Kansas procedure).
156. The Kansas rules of civil procedure, so spelled in the lowercase by designation of KAN. STAT.
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non-standard rules governing matters of local practice or aspects of Kansas
practice that continue to vary from the standard of the Federal Rules. 157
Most of the 1966 and 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules have been
incorporated into the Kansas rules. 58 Although the Kansas procedural
system thus has much in common with the Federal Rules, the number and
content of non-standard Kansas rules 59 and the lack of judicial rule-




Under the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, Kentucky's procedural
system has replicated the FRCP since 1953.161 Popular demand, 162 as well
ANN. § 60-269 (1983), are the second article of Chapter 60 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-101 (1983) (1963 Act adding Chapter 60 to be known as Code of Civil Procedure);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-201 (1983) (scope of application of Article 2's rules of civil procedure). The
Kansas rules of civil procedure follow the enumeration of the Federal Rules except for the prefix
designating the chapter and article of the Kansas Statutes Annotated. Hence KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-208(a) (1983) is the Kansas rule of civil procedure counterpart to Federal Rule 8(a). Kansas courts
look to federal precedent as relevant to construction of the Kansas rules. See, e.g., Fredricks v. Foltz,
221 Kan. 28, 557 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1976); Jones v. Smith, 5 Kan. App. 2d 352, 616 P.2d 300, 302
(1980).
157. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-203 (1983) (commencement of action requires service of
process); 60-209(h)-(j) (1983) (expanded categories of matters to be specially pleaded); 60-211 (1983)
(liability of attorneys for frivolous pleadings); 60-258(a) (1983) (comparative negligence replaces
contributory negligence). With respect to the Kansas rule regarding when a civil action commences,
see Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
158. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §8 60-219, 60-223, 60-224 (1983) (tracking 1966 joinder
amendments to Federal Rules); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-226 to -237 (1983) (tracking 1970 discovery
amendments to Federal Rules). But cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-217(a) (1983) (tracks Federal Rule 17(a)
without anti-dismissal language added to Federal Rule 17(a) in 1966). Kansas amended its version of
Federal Rule 11 in 1982, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-211 (1983), adding more forceful language about
sanctions for sham pleading a year before the federal counterpart was amended to like effect. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 11 (as amended 1983). See generally Schroeder, Recent Development in Kansas Civil
Procedure, 32 KAN. L. REv. 515, 531 (1984).
The 1982 amendment to the Kansas version of Rule 11 was by statute. 1982 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 241.
Although the 1963 Code of Civil Procedure included a provision vesting in the Supreme Court of
Kansas the power to amend the statutory rules of civil procedure, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2607
(1976) (superseded); Schoof v. Byrd, 197 Kan. 38, 47,415 P.2d 384,391 (1966); Gard, supra note 153,
at 217, this power has since been repealed. 1981 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 237. This may well impair the
flexibility of the Kansas rules and detract in the future from their similarity to the Federal Rules. See
Gard, supra note 153, at 216-18. See generally WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 10, at 81 (legislative
intervention in the rule-making process "is productive only of woe"); Gard, supra note 153, at 216
(rule-making power is inherent to judicial power).
159. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 158.
161. For text of Kentucky's rules, see Ky. REV. STAT. "Rules" (1983 replacement), or KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. "Civil Rules" (Baldwin 1978).
162. After soliciting advice from the entire Kentucky bench and bar, Kentucky's Civil Code
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as the perceived impact of the FRCP, 163 spurred on Kentucky's transforma-
tion. Although the Kentucky Rules differ from the FRCP in the numbering
of their subdivisions' 64 and by the insertion of minor details reflecting local
practice, 165 they are faithful to the fundamental principles of the Federal
Rules 166 and have incorporated their most important amendments.167
LOUISIANA
Fact Pleading/Code-Based Procedural System
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure is a civil law code 168 with a
unique and colorful history of French and Spanish influence. 169 Louisiana
employs fact pleading 70 which has recently been "tempered" consider-
ably by liberal rules of amendment. 171 Fact pleading in Louisiana was first
Committee discovered that "a surprising proportion of the letters received recommended that the
Committee should attempt to follow, as closely as possible, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
Fowler & Catlett, Report of the Civil Code Committee, 16 Ky. ST. B.J. 23 (1951).
163. In adopting the FRCP model system, Kentucky's Civil Code Committee noted that many of
Kentucky's sister states had adopted the FRCP. It found that:
every state in the Union had felt the influence of the federal rules-some only to the extent of an
adoption of pre-trial procedure-except six, and in that number was Kentucky. The Committee
was impressed with the extent, and apparent success, of the use of the federal rules in state courts,
and was surprised that a procedural tidal wave, which promise[d] to exceed that produced by the
Field Code, was so quietly at work in America.
Fowler & Catlett, supra note 162, at 23-24.
164. For example, FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (concerning claims for relief) finds its Kentucky counter-
part in Kentucky Rule 8.01.
165. See, e.g., KY. R. Civ. P. 13.04, 14.03, 17.04, 59.01.
166. Kentucky has enthusiastically embraced notice pleading. See, e.g., Upton v. Knuckles, 470
S.W. 2d 822, 825-27 (Ky. 1971); Shreve v. TaylorCounty Pub. Library Bd., 419 S. W. 2d 779,782 (Ky.
1967). Precedent construing parallel Federal Rules is frequently used to aid in the interpretation of their
Kentucky counterparts. See, e.g., Perry v. Kessinger, 652 S.W.2d 655,658 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Davis
v. Dever, 617 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
167. See Clay, Significant 1969Amendments to the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 KY. L.J.
7 (1969) ("It has been our policy since 1953 to have our procedure conform as closely as possible to that
in the federal courts .. "). Kentucky's discovery rules were comprehensively revised in 1971 to
conform to the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules, but, except for the 1983 amendment to Rule 11,
Kentucky has not generally conformed its rules to the Federal Rules as amended in 1980 and 1983.
168. McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1960).
169. See generally Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana Projet of 1823: A General
Analytical Survey, 47 TtiL. L. REv. 1(1972); Dart, Discussion of the Early Sources of Louisiana Law, 2
LoYoLA L.J. 1(1921); 3 LOYOLA L.J. 1(1922); McMahon, TheBackground, Structure, and Composition
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 7 LA. B.J. 246 (1960); Rabalais, The Influence of Spanish
Laws and Treatises on the Jurisprudence of Louisiana: 1762-1828, 42 LA. L. REv. 1485 (1982).
170. See LA. CODE Civ. PRoC. ANN. art. 854 (Official Revision Comments) (West 1984) ("This
article preserves the Louisiana system of pleading facts as being preferable to the notice pleading of the
Federal Rules. . . or to any other modified system of notice pleading."); art. 891 ("petition. . .shall
contain a short, clear and concise statement of the object of the demand and of the material facts upon
which the cause of action is based"); art. 1003 (requiring answer to state "material facts" of defenses).
171. See McMahon, supra note 168, at 29.
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codified in the Practice Act of 1912, superseding the prior simple notice
pleading system and constituting a procedural step backwards for Loui-
siana. 172 Louisiana's permissible pleadings have changed little since this
time and still include "petitions [complaints], exceptions [demurrers],
written motions [considered pleadings], and answers." 173 Louisiana's pre-
emptory exception of no cause of action1 74 is essentially a common law
demurrer1 75 and thus admits well-pleaded facts while testing a petition's
legal sufficiency. 176 The petition must plead ultimate facts; conclusions of
law and evidentiary facts cannot state a cause of action. 177 Rule-making
power in Louisiana is vested in the legislature and has not been granted to
the Louisiana Supreme Court. 178
MAINE
Federal Rules Replica
The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure took effect in 1959,179 transforming
Maine's civil procedure from a code pleading system into one patterned
closely after the Federal Rules. 180 The Maine Rules have innovative fea-
tures 181 and address the details of local practice. 182 While they have incor-
172. See McMahon, The Case Against Fact Pleading in Louisiana, 13 LA. L. REV. 369, 386-90
(1953) (Louisiana Supreme Court's sudden employment of fact pleading criteria in scrutinizing
pleadings around turn of century was precipitated by exposure to monograph on subject by Michigan
law professor in legal treatise; 1912 Practice Act codified need for "material facts"). Prior to 1912,
Louisiana pleading was similar to France's under the French Civil Ordinance of 1670: Louisiana's
Superior Council's clerk summarized in a concise and sufficient statement (probably taken from
counsel's oral pleading) the litigant's presentation of the cause. Flory & McMahon, The New Federal
Rules and Louisiana Practice, 1 LA. L. REv. 45, 46 n.3, 51 (1938); see also McMahon, supra note 168.
Cf. Tucker, Proposalfor Retention of the Louisiana System of Fact Pleading; Expose des Motifs, 13 LA.
L. REv. 395,401,424 (1953) (because Louisiana pleading never required an attorney to bring his claims
within the rigid common law forms of action and there had never been a law/equity bifurcation, the
concept of a "cause of action" in Louisiana had never been encrusted with the difficulties of that of the
common law).
173. LA. CODE CIv. PRoc. ANN. art. 852 (West 1984) (pleadings allowed). Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a)
(simpler scheme and terminology); FED. R. Civ. P. 7(c) (abolishing exceptions).
174. LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 927(4) (West 1984).
175. See Young v. Thompson, 189 So. 487, 489 (La. Ct. App. 1939).
176. See Darville v. Texaco, Inc. 447 So. 2d 473 (La. 1984).
177. See McMahon, supra note 172 at 388-89 (citing Louisiana's seminal fact pleading case of
State v. Hackley, 124 La. 854, 863-64, 50 So. 772, 775-76 (1909)).
178. See WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.19, at 58.
179. For the title of the Maine Rules and their original effective date, see ME. R. Civ. P. 85, 86(a).
The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure may be found in MAINE RULES OF COURT (West 1985).
180. For the history of Maine's civil procedural system and its conversion to a federal replica, see
WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.20, at 59.
181. Maine's compulsory counterclaim rule applies to the claims of a plaintiff against an im-
pleaded third-party defendant, ME. R. Civ. P. 14(a), but not when the potential counterclaimant is
defending against a claim "for damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or control of a motor
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porated most of the important amendments to the FRCP, 183 some recent
amendments to the Maine Rules have introduced differences of detail vis-a-
vis the Federal Rules. 184 In enumeration, organization, and philosophy,
however, the Maine Rules remain a replica of their federal counterparts. 1
85
MARYLAND
Fact Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System
Until 1984, Maryland retained the division of law and equity as part of
its idiosyncratic procedural system. 186 In a sweeping reform, the Maryland
Court of Appeals adopted new rules 187 that moved Maryland procedure
much closer to the federal model. Demurrers, pleas, and replications were
abolished. 188 The motion for bill of particulars, permitted under the pre-
vious rules, 8 9 was replaced with the motion for more definite statement. 190
Maryland's new discovery' 91 and joinder' 92 rules have much in common
with the FRCP, although significant differences remain 193 along with more
trivial variations of detail. 194 Maryland has made no effort to emulate the
vehicle." ME. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
182. See, e.g., ME. R. Ctv. P. 80-80K (special rules for various types of proceedings common in
courts of local jurisdiction); ME. R. Civ. P. app. form 34 (Order for Protection from Abuse).
183. The Maine Rules conform to the federal joinder amendments of 1966 and discovery amend-
ments of 1967.
184. Maine stiffened its version of Rule I I and expanded the powers of the trial court under Rule 16
prior to the similar federal amendments of 1983. There is some variation in detail, but little in effect,
between the amended Maine and Federal Rules. Absent court order for good cause, Maine limits a party
to serving only one set of interrogatories on each opposing party. ME. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
185. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 225 (Me. 1980) (discussing Maine's
policy of notice pleading). For Maine's construction of its rules in light of federal precedent, see Durgin
v. Robertson, 428 A.2d 65 (1981); Maine Central R.R. v. Bangor& Aroostook R.R., 395 A.2d 1107
(1978).
186. See 9B MD. CODE ANN., MD. R.P. 1, § d (Mitchie 1977) (superseded): "These Rules shall not
be interpreted to affect the existing distinction between law and equity." Cf. MD. CODE ANN., I MD.
RULES, Rule 2-301 (Mitchie 1985) (abolishing the procedural distinction between law and equity in
favor of "one form of action known as 'civil action."'). On the tradition of idiosyncrasy in Maryland
procedure, see WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.21, at 59-60.
187. The order adopting the new rules is reprinted in MD. CODE ANN., 1 MD. RULES, at 15-17
(Mitchie 1985). The Rules were adopted in 1984.
188. MD. R.P. 2-302. Under the superseded Maryland Rules of Procedure, demurrers at law and in
equity were still employed. 9B MD. CODE ANN., MD. R.P. 345, 371 (Mitchie 1971) (superseded).
189. See 9B MD. CODE ANN., MD. R.P. 346 (Mitchie 1971) (superseded).
190. See MD. R.P. 2-322(d).
191. See MD. R.P. 2-401 to -434.
192. See MD. R.P. 2-211 to -231; 2-203(c); 2-331 to -332.
193. All conventional counterclaims are permissive in Maryland, see MD. R.P. 2-331, but under
Maryland third-party practice a plaintiff's claims against an impleaded third party defendant are
compulsory. Mo. R.P. 2-332(c).
194. See, e.g., MD. R.P. 2-302 (providing that any response to a counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint shall be termed an "answer"). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (providing for replies,
answers and third-party answers).
1401
Washington Law Review
enumeration or organizational structure of the Federal Rules, and more
significantly, Maryland retains fact-pleading. 195 Its procedural system thus
remains idiosyncratic, but with a pronounced federal flavor.
MASSACHUSETTS
Federal Rules Replica
The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure 196 are a replica of the
FRCP. The rules established a uniform civil procedure for Massachusetts'
trial courts, which had previously operated under different sets of rules. 197
Prior to the promulgation of the Massachusetts Rules by the Supreme
Judicial Court,198 Massachusetts operated under a Practice Act requiring
essentially code pleading. 199 Notice pleading is now firmly entrenched in
Massachusetts, 200 and precedent construing the Federal Rules is given
great weight in interpreting the state rules. 201
195. MD. R.P. 2-305 requires a pleading to set forth "a clear statement of the facts necessary to
constitute a cause of action." Despite the 1984 substitution of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, see MD. R.P. 2-322(b), the Maryland Court of Appeals
continues to recite the litany of the general demurrer: "[W]e are required to assume the truth of all
material and relevant facts that are well pleaded .... " Salvatore v. Cunningham, 505 A.2d 102, 103
(Md. 1986). The degree of specificity required of a pleading in Maryland has on occasion been cast in a
functional rather than a formalistic sense. See Kres v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 329 A.2d 44, 46 (Md.
App. 1974) (cause of action is shown by "facts disclosing that the claimant has justification for filing a
declaration able to withstand a demurrer") (emphasis added). But this spirit is not universal among
Maryland courts. See Whaley v. Maryland State Bank, 473 A.2d 1351, 1357 (Md. App. 1984) (claim of
negligent misrepresentation must "allege the existence of each of the five elements of the tort").
196. The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure may be found in MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF
COURT 5-115 (West 1985).
197. See 43A MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. XLV-XLIX (West 1978) (superseded); see also
MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF COURT 3 (West 1985) (letter to Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts from Chief Justices of Massachusetts District Courts and Municipal
Court of the City of Boston noting issuance ofjoint orderadopting Massachusetts Rules forthose systems
and expressing pleasure "that there is now a unified approach to rules in the the trial courts of the
Commonwealth").
198. The order promulgating the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure is reprinted in
MAssAcHusETTs RULES OF COURT at 2 (West 1985). These Rules became effective July 1, 1975.
199. See Leventhal v. Dockser, 361 Mass. 894, 282 N.E.2d 680 (1972); Saraceno v. City of
Peabody, 361 Mass. 696, 282 N.E.2d 389 (1972). See generally WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.22, at 60.
200. See, e.g., Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 450 N.E.2d 190, 194 (1983).
201. See Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174,330 N.E.2d 814, 818 (1975)
("This court having adopted comprehensive rules of civil procedure in substantially the same form as
the earlier Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the adjudged construction heretofore given to the Federal
rules is to be given to our rules, absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in
content."). See also University Hosp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 396
Mass. 533, 487 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1986); Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v. Servfast of Brockton, Inc., 393
Mass. 287, 471 N.E.2d 77, 79 (1984).
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MICHIGAN
Notice Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System
The Michigan Supreme Court continued Michigan's evolution toward
federally modeled civil procedure with the Michigan Court Rules of
1985.202 Traditional code pleading devices such as demurrers and pleas in
abatement have long been absent from Michigan practice. 20 3 Though the
1985 rules literally prescribe fact pleading,204 this language was carried
over from a former rule205 that was liberally construed to require no more
specificity than notice pleading. 20 6 Michigan recognizes only one form of
action 20 7 but has no compulsory counterclaim rule similar to FRCP
13(a). 208 Michigan and federal third-party practice 209 are similar except for
differences in counterclaim practice. 210 The Michigan Court Rules do not
follow the organization or enumeration of the Federal Rules. 211
202. See 1 MICH. Cr. R. OF 1985, Rule 1.102 (Callaghan 1984) [hereinafter MICH. CT. R.]. On the
history of the Michigan Supreme Court's rule-making power, see WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.23, at
49.
203. See MICH. STAT. ANN. 1963 GEN. CT. R. 110.3 (Callaghan 1976) [hereinafter 1963 GEN. Cr.
R.].
204. Michigan Court Rule 2.111(B)(1) requires a "statement of the facts, without repetition, on
which the pleader relies in stating the cause of action, with the specific allegations necessary reasonably
to inform the adverse party of the nature of the claims the adverse party is called on to defend."
205. 1963 GEN. CT. R. 111.
206. Fenton Country House, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 63 Mich. App. 445,234 N.W.2d 559
(1975); City of Auburn v. Brown, 60 Mich. App. 258, 230 N.W.2d 385 (1975).
207. MICH. Cr. R. 2.101(A), formerly 1963 GEN. C. R. 12.
208. Michigan's idiosyncratic, conditionally compulsory counterclaim practice is a side effect of
its rule that a pleader must join to a claim every other transactionally related claim, MICH. CT. R.
2.203(A)(1), subject to waiver for lack of objection by the opposing party of the pleader's failure to join
such claims. MICH. CT. R. 2.203(A)(2). Michigan's counterclaim rule is otherwise permissive, MICH.
Cr. R. 2.203(B), but the compulsory joinder rules require compulsory joinder of all other coun-
terclaims a defendant has against a party if a defendant asserts any counterclaim that arises out of the
same transaction or occurrence as is the subject matter of the original action. For an example of the non-
preclusive operation of Michigan's permissive counterclaim rule in circumstances in which the federal
compulsory counterclaim rule would have barred the second action, see Rinaldi v. Rinaldi, 122 Mich.
App. 391, 333 N.W.2d 61, 64-66 (1983).
209. See MICH. CT. R. 2.204.
210. See supra note 208.
211. The rules on civil procedure, constituting Chapter Two of the Michigan Court Rules of 1985,
are numbered 2.001 through 2.630. As an example of differences in organization, compare Michigan
Court Rule 2.116 ("Summary Disposition" rule) with FRCP 12(b) (motions to dismiss) and FRCP 56
(summary judgment).
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MINNESOTA
Federal Rules Replica
Minnesota's Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts212 are a
replica of the FRCP. When they went into effect in 1952 by order of the
Minnesota Supreme Court,2 13 they substituted a system "virtually identi-
cal" to the Federal Rules for one of the nation's most progressive systems of
code pleading. 2 14 Most intervening amendments to the Federal Rules have
become part of Minnesota practice.2 15 Federal precedent guides con-




Notice Pleading/Federal-Rules-Model Procedural System
Despite legislative hostility, the Mississippi Supreme Court has led its
state away from the idiosyncratic amalgam of common law and code
pleading procedures that long governed civil litigation in Mississippi. 2 18
Invoking its inherent constitutional authority, the Supreme Court enacted
state rules modeled on the FRCP. 2 19 The Mississippi Rules of Civil Pro-
212. The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure may be found in MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT 9-59
(West 1986).
213. The Minnesota Rules took effect January I, 1952. MINN. R. Civ. P. 86.01. The rule-making
authority of the Minnesota Supreme Court is discussed in WRIGHT I, supra note I. § 9.24, at 62.
214. WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.24, at 62.
215. See, e.g., MINN. R. Civ. P. 19.01 (as amended effective 1968); id. 26.01 (as amended effective
1975 and 1985).
216. See, e.g., Everson v. Kapperman, 343 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. 1984); Engelrup v. Potter, 302
Minn. 157, 224 N.W.2d 484, 486 (1974).
217. See Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Minn. 1978); Hutton v. Bosiger, 366 N.W.2d
358, 360 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
218. For Mississippi practice prior to 1982, see Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commander, 169 Miss. 847,153
So. 877 (1934) (only defect in pleading rendering it insufficient on demurrer is that it fails to state a
cause of action or defense); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-7-33, 11-7-35 (1972) (action commenced by filing
of a "declaration" setting forth "a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and
concise language"); Miss. CODE ANN. §3 11-7-79, 11-7-81, 11-7-83, 11-7-85, 11-7-87 (1972 & Cum.
Supp. 1985) (dealing with demurrers); id. § 11-7-93 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1985) (abolishing special
demurrers); See generally WRIGHT I. supra note I, § 9.25, at 62-63. In supporting the proposed
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, Professor Abbott noted "eighty-five years [of] dismay and
concern" among bench and bar "over the antiquated and confusing morass of legislatively created court
rules." Abbott, The Proposed Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure-An Argument for Adoption, 49
Miss. L.J. 285, 286 (1978).
219. After conferring general rule-making power on the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1975, see
MISS. CODE ANN. 33 9-3-61 to 73 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1985), the Mississippi Legislature vetoed the
supreme court's proposal of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Relying on its inherent authority
under the state constitution, the supreme court adopted the proposed rules on May 26, 1981, effective
January 1, 1982. See Foreword, Symposium on Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, 52 Miss. L.J. I,
1-2 (1982) [hereinafter Symposium]. The legislature's expressed disapproval of some of the rules has
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cedure generally follow the FRCP in enumeration and organization. 220
Notice pleading is permitted in effect if not in name, 221 and federal
precedent is regarded as authoritative in construing the state rules. 222
Mississippi's constitution, however, preserves bifurcated systems of law
and equity trial courts. 223 In light of this factor and the conflict between the
Supreme Court and the legislature over rule-making power, we classify
Mississippi's procedural system as modeled on the Federal Rules but not a
replica of them.
MISSOURI
Fact Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System
Missouri is an idiosyncratic jurisdiction that has been considerably
influenced by the Federal Rules, but clings to the fact pleading heritage of
its Field-type Code.224 Pursuant to constitutional authorization, its Su-
preme Court has promulgated an elaborate set of rules of civil procedure
that cover the same subjects as their federal counterparts but in much
different sequence and often to different effect.225 Although there is agree-
ment in substance as to some important topics, 226 Missouri differs from
been ineffective, and the legislature has taken no further action. See 1982 Mississippi Supreme Court
Review, 53 Miss. L.J. 113, 129-30 (1983). It is presently unclear whether an amendment to the
Mississippi Constitution purporting to limit the jurisdiction of the supreme court to matters "specifi-
cally provided by this Constitution," will curtail the Mississippi Supreme Court's rule-making power.
See Miss. CoNsT art. 6, § 146.
The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure are not included in any volume or appendix of the
Mississippi Code Annotated, but may be found in Mississn'pi RULES OF COURT (West 1985).
220. In an apparent effort to defuse some of the legislative opposition to the Mississippi Rules, the
Mississippi Supreme Court deleted the provisions for third-party practice borrowed from Federal Rule
14 and also returned to prior state practice regarding service of process. See Symposium, supra note 219,
at 2.
221. See Smith v. City of West Point, 475 So. 2d 816, 818 (Miss. 1985) (complaint alleging
defendant was "liable for its officer's negligence on a respondeat superior basis" held sufficient because
"[i]t does not appear beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no facts that would entitle her to relief");
Stanton & Associates, Inc. v. Bryant Constr. Co., 464 So. 2d 499,505-06 & n.6 (Miss. 1985) (Federal
Rule 8(a)(2) and Mississippi Rule 8(a)(1) are identically worded and should be construed alike; court
need not address whether "the theory of 'notice pleadings' has been adopted in Mississippi, but
observes that "[t]he most important thing to remember about pleadings under the Mississippi Rules of
Civil Procedure is that they simply are not very important anymore"). See generally 1982 Mississippi
Supreme Court Review, supra note 219, at 138-39 (notice pleading standard introduced to Mississippi
practice by Mississippi Rule 8(a)).
222. Stanton & Associates, Inc., 464 So. 2d at 505 & n.5 (Miss. 1985)
223. Miss. CONST. art. 6, §§ 156, 159. A judgment from the wrong court is not void for lack of
jurisdiction. Miss. CON T. art. 6, § 147.
224. The Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure may be found in MissouRI RULES OF COURT 189-315
(West 1985); their official designation is as Rules 41-102 of the MissoURI RULES OF CoURr.
225. See generally WmoHTr I, supra note I, § 9.26, at 63-64.
226. See, e.g., Mo. R. 55.27 (providing for defenses, objections and motions substantially the
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federal policy in the crucial area of pleading. A Missouri "petition" 227 must
contain "a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief," 228 and although pleading technicality is discouraged by
Missouri courts, fact rather than notice pleading prevails. 229
MONTANA
Federal Rules Replica
Montana abandoned code pleading230 when its legislature adopted feder-
ally modeled rules in 1962.231 Conferral of rule-making power on the
Supreme Court232 and conformity to federal summary judgment practice2 33
have made Montana's procedural system a replica of the Federal Rules.234
same as Federal Rule 12(b) to 12(h)); Mo. R. 55.27 (a)(6) (Federal Rule 12(b)(6) counterpart motion
attacking "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted").
227. Missouri Rule 55.01 requires a complaint to be called a "petition."
228. Mo. R. 55.05.
229. Robbins v. Jewish Hosp., 663 S.W.2d 341, 349 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("While Missouri,
despite its broadened discovery rules, has not yet seen fit to adopt the 'notice pleading' of federal
procedure, we are not about to revert to the hypertechnical intricacies of common law pleading.");
Bremson v. Kinder-Care Learning Centers, Inc., 651 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("Rule
55.05 commits Missouri to 'fact' pleading, as opposed to the notice pleading permitted in the federal
courts under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
230. See, e.g., Miller v. Schrock, 135 Mont. 409, 340 P.2d 154 (1959). See generally WRIGHT I,
supra note 1, § 9.27, at 64-65.
231. Pursuant to MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 93-221 to 93-233 (1947) (superseded), the Montana
Supreme Court appointed a Civil Rules Commission and thereafter submitted this Commission's
proposed draft of civil rules to the Montana legislature. The legislature then enacted these rules to
become effective January 1, 1962. 1961 Mont. Laws 13. "Basically the Rules follow the pattern of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but with some modifications to adapt the Rules to state practice and to
Montana law and customs." 7 MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 93 (preface) (1964) (superseded). The Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure repealed or superseded over 150 procedural provisions of the code. See 7
MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 93 preface (1964) (superseded).
232. As Professor Wright has pointed out, Montana was a rarity in converting to federally styled
rules of procedure by legislative enactment. WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.27, at 52 & n.64. This
anomaly, at odds with replica status, has been rectified both by statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-2-701,
and in the new state constitution of 1972. MONT. CONsT. art. 7, § 2(3) (procedural rule-making power
conferred on supreme court "subject to disapproval by the legislature in either of the two sessions
following promulgation").
233. Montana's bizarre conception of summary judgment without affidavits, see WRIGHT II, supra
note 9, § 9.27, at 52-53 & n.66, was replaced in 1976 with a conventional replication of Federal Rule
56. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 56 (as amended).
234. The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure may be found in 4 MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 25, Rules
1-86 (1984). On notice pleading in Montana, see R. H. Schwartz Constr. Specialties, Inc., v.
Hanrahan, 672 P.2d 1116, 1117, 1119 (Mont. 1983); Kinion v. Design Sys., Inc., 197 Mont. 177,641 P.2d
472, 474 (1982); Brothers v. Surplus Tractor Parts Corp., 161 Mont. 412, 506 P.2d 1362, 1364 (1973).
On the persuasive stature of precedent and commentary construing the Federal Rules, see White v.
Lobdell, 678 P.2d 637,641(1984); Wheat v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 146 Mont. 105,404 P.2d 317 (1965).
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NEBRASKA
Fact PleadinglCode-Based Procedural System
Nebraska retains a code-based procedural system235 despite an early bid
to become an FRCP model. One year after the Federal Rules' adoption, the
Nebraska legislature authorized and directed the Nebraska Supreme Court
to promulgate general rules of practice and procedure for all courts. 236 The
court was specifically authorized to abolish the distinction between law and
equity actions. 237 The new rules were to supersede old code provisions by
their own force,238 but the legislature reserved authority to change, amend,
or repeal any of the rules.239 Unfortunately, opposition to FRCP adoption
by a vocal and influential minority of older Nebraska bar members240 led to
the legislature's rejection241 of the FRCP-based rules promulgated by the
Nebraska Supreme Court.242 This rejection ended Nebraska's efforts at
FRCP adoption.
Nebraska's contemporary procedure employs typical code pleading ter-
minology. Demurrers are still used,243 and a Nebraska "petition" must
state "facts constituting the cause of action."244 Only transactionally or
factually related counterclaims may be asserted, 245 but the only sanction
imposed on a defendant for failure to assert a counterclaim is an inability to
recover costs against the plaintiff in a subsequent action on the coun-
terclaim. 246
235. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-101-25-2506 (1979) for all rules pertaining to civil procedure in
Nebraska's trial courts of general jurisdiction. Section 25-101 merges law and equity.




240. See Shackelford, Why Adopt New Rules of Pleading and Practice?, 21 NEB. L. REv. 94
(1942). Contra Bongardt, The Final Draft Report, Nebraska Rules of Civil Procedure: "Pro", 21 NEB.
L. REv. 76 (1942); Simmons, WhyNewRules of ProcedureNow?, 26 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc. 170, 175
(1943) ("[O]pposition to these rules comes largely from men past military age and ... the younger
men of the profession have generally been favorable to the rules. They are the ones now in the military
service.").
241. 1943 Neb. Laws 145. The bill also withdrew the rule-making power of the Nebraska Supreme
Court.
242. See generally Simmons, supra note 240 (Chief Justice Robert G. Simmons' plea to the
legislature in support of the FRCP system).
243. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-806-25-810 (concerning the use of demurrers); see also id.
§ 25-806(6) (demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action); § 25-807
(general demurrer presumed unless grounds for special demurrer are specified). Cf. FED. R. Cry. P. 7(c)
(abolishing demurrers).
244. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-804(2) (1979).
245. Id. § 25-813.
246. Id. § 25-814.
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NEVADA
Notice Pleading/Federal-Rules-Model Procedural System
The Nevada Supreme Court adopted the Nevada Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in 1952.247 Prior to these rules, 248 Nevada was a code-pleading
jurisdiction. 249 The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure250 are modeled on the
FRCP, but contain at least one trap for the unwary attorney who assumes
that the Nevada Rules are a replica of their federal counterparts. Nevada,
like Idaho, 25 1 conceals within its rules a special appearance rule incompati-
ble with replica status. 252 Cases and commentary interpreting the Federal
Rules are instructive in construing the Nevada Rules, 253 and Nevada courts
have long accepted that their federally modeled rules commit them to
notice pleading. 254
247. The Nevada Supreme Court adopted the rules pursuant to 1951 Nev. Stat. 44, codified at NEV.
REV. STAT. § 2.120 (1981) (Supreme Court of Nevada may and shall promulgate rules of civil procedure
from time to time for purpose of "promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits").
See also Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 NEv. REV. STAT. 1171(1981) (foreword) (adoption of FRCP-
based rules "constitutes perhaps the state's most important advancement of the administration ofjustice
in civil cases," and vesting rule-making power in Supreme Court "was well-advised and forward-
looking legislation").
248. See 2 NEV. REV. STAT. 1169 (1979) (Order Adopting Rules of Civil Procedure). These rules
were effective on January 1, 1953.
249. See 4 NEV. COmP. LAWS §§ 8591-8642 (Bender-Moss 1930) (superseded) (old code pleading
provisions).
250. See 2 NEV. REV. STAT. tits. 2-3 (1983).
251. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
252. Nevada's versions of Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(h) have been construed as perpetuating a special
appearance rule. Unlike the federal courts, Nevada considers a motion raising a lack of personal
jurisdiction defense under Rule 12(b)(2) to be merely a motion to quash service of process. The
seemingly innocuous request for dismissal of an action in which a motion to quash has been granted has
been held sufficient to constitute a "general appearance" rendering the lack of jurisdiction moot.
Consolidated Casinos Corp. v. L.A. Caunter & Co., 89 Nev. 501, 515 P.2d 1025, 1026-27 (1973);
Barnato v. Second Judicial District Court, 76 Nev. 335, 353 P.2d 1103, 1104-05 (1960). The subtle
discrepancy between the text of the Nevada and federal versions of Rules 12(b) and 12(h) makes this an
especially treacherous rule for the attorney unfamiliar with the idiosyncrasy of Nevada practice, and
thus compels classification of Nevada's procedural system as something other than a replica of federal
civil procedure.
253. A "State and Federal Rules Table" appears as a preface to the Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure, setting forth the comparable federal rule for each Nevada rule and the section in "Wright and
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure" in which "each rule is explained and construed, and where
authorities as to the meaning of the language of the rules may be found." 2NEv. REV. STAT. 1173 (1979).
But no warning is given of the anachronistic content attributed by the Nevada Supreme Court to Nevada
Rule 12(b)(2). Cf. supra note 252 (general appearance rule survives Nevada's adoption of federally
modeled rules of civil procedure).
254. Branda v. Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 637 P.2d 1223, 1227 (1981); Crucil v. Carson City, 95 Nev.
583, 600 P.2d 216, 217 (1979); Taylor v. State, 73 Nev. 151, 311 P.2d 733, 734 (1957) (dicta).
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NEW HAMPSHIRE
Notice Pleading/Idiosyncratic Procedural System
New Hampshire has an idiosyncratic procedural system that defies
classification as either code-based or rules-based. Its codified pleading
provisions are few and express a liberal philosophy toward pleading.Zs5 The
rather circumscribed rule-making power statutorily delegated to New
Hampshire's courts25 6 has been exercised in a "fairly substantial" manner
to create rules supplementing procedural statutes. 25 7 In New Hampshire,
complaints are liberally construed according to notice pleading standards
so that "if counsel can understand the dispute and the court can decide the
controversy on its merits, the pleadings are adequate. '258
NEW JERSEY
Fact Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System
Although Judge Clark characterized New Jersey as an adherent of the
Federal Rules,259 in our view modem New Jersey practice is too idio-
syncratic to be classified as modeled on the -FRCP. The New Jersey
Superior Court is bifurcated into law and equity sides and a claim brought
on the wrong side is subject to objection and transfer.2 60 The numbering
255. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 515:3 to 515:6 (1974) (four pleading provisions under heading
of "Pleadings"). The liberal nature of the codified provisions is typified by N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 514:8, which states:
No writ, declaration, return, process, judgment or other proceeding in the courts or course of
justice shall be abated, quashed or reversed for any error or mistake, where the person or case may
be rightly understood by the court, nor through defect or want of form or addition only; and courts
and justices may, on motion, order amendment in any such case.
256. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 491:10 (1983) (allowing Superior Court, "acting as a body" to
promulgate rules "consistent with the laws"); see also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 490:4 (supreme court's
authority to "approve" rules of court with respect to all courts of inferior jurisdiction); § 490-A:3
(providing that chief justices of the supreme and superior courts may collaborate to "issue" rules not
inconsistent with any rules adopted pursuant to sections 490:4 and 491:10).
257. See WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.30, at 66.
258. Robbins v. Seekamp, 122 N.H. 318,444 A.2d 537, 539 (1982). Though this notice pleading
classification is not completely free from doubt, cf. Porter v. Dziura, 104 N.H. 89, 179 A.2d 281, 282
(1962) (requiring pleading to disclose "the theory on which the plaintiffis proceeding"), we feel that it is
warranted by the more recent cases. See Robbins v. Seekamp, 122 N.H. 318,444 A.2d 537,539 (1982);
Sexton Motors, Inc. v. Renault Northeast, Inc., 121 N.H. 460, 431 A.2d 116, 119 (1981).
The reforms of the mid-nineteenth century accomplished an all-but-nominal merger of law and
equity and relaxed the rigidity of the common law procedure to which New Hampshire's courts had
adhered. See generally Reid, From Common Sense to Common Law to Charles Doe-The Evolution of
Pleading in New Hampshire, N.H.B.J., Apr. 1959, at 27 (procedural reforms championed by Chief
Justice Charles Doe anticipated those of the Federal Rules and "saved" New Hampshire from becoming
a code state by judicially achieving the great reforms that other states needed extensive codified systems
to accomplish).
259. Clark, Pleading Under The Federal Rules, 12 Wvo. L.J. 177, 178 (1958).
260. See N.J. Civ. PI:Ac. R. 4:3-1.
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and sequence of its rules do not conform to those of the FRCP. New Jersey's
rules provide that a pleading "shall contain a statement of the facts on
which the claim is based" 261 rather than merely a "short and plain state-
ment of the . . . claim." 262 The provisions governing permissive and
mandatory counterclaims263 differ considerably from those of federal rep-
lica states and are inconveniently separated in the New Jersey rules' text.
If not a satellite of the FRCP, New Jersey's civil procedure is certainly in
a similar orbit. New Jersey courts consider Federal Rules decisions to be
persuasive authority in interpreting their counterpart rules.264 Rule-making
power in New Jersey is constitutionally vested in the New Jersey Supreme
Court265 and the court has held that legislation is ineffective to override
judicially prescribed procedure. 266
NEW MEXICO
Federal Rules Replica
The Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of New Mexico 267
have replicated the FRCP for over four decades. 268 The New Mexico
Supreme Court adopted these rules pursuant to an enabling statute. 269 The
rules share identical numbering with the FRCP, 270 and federal decisions are
persuasive authority for New Mexico courts' interpretation of the state
rules.27
1
261. N.J. Civ. PRAC. R. 4:5-2.
262. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
263. See N.J. CIv. PRAC. R. 4:7, 4:27-1(b). Compulsory counterclaims are called "mandatory" in
New Jersey.
264. See, e.g., Freeman v. Lincoln Beach Motel, 182 N.J. Super. 483, 442 A.2d 650, 651 (1981)
("Since ourcourt rules are based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is appropriate to turn to federal
case law for guidance" when construing discovery rules.); Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380,471 A.2d
395,401 (1984) ("It is therefore proper to draw on the experience ofthe federal courts with.., rule [59]
to aid in the solution of comparable problems that arise under. . . rule [4:49)."); Quick Chek Food
Stores v. Township of Springfield, 83 N.J. 438,416 A.2d 840,844 (1980) ("R.4:49-1 was modeled after
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and it is therefore appropriate for us to consider as a guide the
interpretation of the federal rule.").
265. N.J. CoNsT. art. 6, § 2, para. 3.
266. See WRIGHT II, supra note 1, § 9.31, at 55, 56 (citing Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74
A.2d 406 (1950)).
267. See I N.M. STAT. ANN. Court Rules, Procedure and Evidence (1980).
268. The New Mexico rules became effective August 1, 1942. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1
(compiler's notes) (1970) (superseded). New Mexico was one of the first federal replica jurisdictions.
269. Act Relating to Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure in the Courts of the State of New
Mexico, ch. 84, 1933 N.M. Laws 147.
270. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1 (compiler's notes) (1970) (superseded).
271. See State Collection Bureau, Inc. v. Roybal, 64 N.M. 275, 327 P.2d 337, 338 (1958). But cf.
Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240 (1982) (dicta recognizing defense of
election of remedies, apparently in conflict with the policy of New Mexico Rule 8(e)(2) and 54(c)). See
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NEW YORK
Fact Pleading/Code-Based Procedural System
New York procedure shows Federal influence, but the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) remain based on the code model. 272 Given
New York's historical preeminence as the birthplace of the Field Code, this
is not surprising. The numbering formats of the CPLR and the FRCP differ
completely.273 New York procedure lacks a compulsory counterclaim
rule. 274 The bill of particulars is still employed. 275 The CPLR does not
contain demurrers, as did its predecessors; 276 instead it employs an analo-
gous motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.277 In New York,
a complaint must contain statements of fact "sufficiently particular to give
the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of
transactions or occurrences intended to be proved and the material ele-
ments of each cause of action." 278 This language effected a procedural
improvement since "[pirior to the enactment of the CPLR, a party was
required to frame the allegations in his pleading in the form of 'ultimate
facts' as opposed to the twin evils of 'evidentiary facts' on the one hand and
'conclusions of law' on the other. "279 New York's ties to the Field Code
remain strong and its flirtation with notice pleading has not yet ripened into
commitment. 280
generally Occhialino, Survey of NewMexicoLaw: Civil Procedure, 14 N.M.L. REV. 17,25-26(1984).
On New Mexico's practice of notice pleading, see Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Mullenix, 97 N.M.
618, 642 P.2d 604, 606 (1982).
272. N.Y. Ctv. Prec. L. & R. § 10,005 (McKinney 1981). The rules were enacted September 1,
1963.
273. The CPLR contains 100 articles broken into sections. See CAHILL-PARSONs NEw YORK CIVIL
PRACncE (1977) (annotated text of the rules).
274. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 3019 (McKinney- 1974).
275. See id. § 3041.
276. The pre-CPLR New York Rules of Civil Practice employed demurrers via Rule 107. See
Halucha v. Jockey Club, 220 N.Y.S. 2d 567, 571, 31 Misc. 2d 186 (1961) (expressly recognizing
validity of "demurrer" in connection with the rule).
277. See N.Y. Civ. PRtc. L. & R. § 3211 (McKinney 1970).
278. See N.Y. Crv. PRtc. L. & R. § 3013 (McKinney 1974).
279. H. WACHTELL, NEw YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 110 (1970). See supra note 278 and
accompanying text (provision purporting to require notice pleading, but containing code phrase "cause
of action").
280. Although the court of appeals has declared notice to be the "primary purpose" of pleadings
under CPLR 3013, Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396,328 N.Y.S.2d 431,438 (1972), the appellate
department has repeatedly demanded specificity as to the particular elements of the cause of action
being pleaded. See DiMauro v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 105 A.D.2d 236, 483 N.Y.S.2d
383, 387 (1984) ("essential facts"); Spallina v. Giannoccaro, 98 A.D.2d 103,469 N.Y.S.2d 824, 827
(1983); Melito v. Interboro Mut. Indemn. Ins. Co., 73 A.D.2d 819, 423 N.Y.S.2d 742, 744 (1979).
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NORTH CAROLINA
Notice Pleading/Federal Code Procedural System
North Carolina switched from a conventional fact pleading code of
procedure when its legislature enacted the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. 281 These codified rules follow very closely the numbering and
content of the Federal Rules, 282 abolishing demurrers283 and, most signifi-
cantly, adopting the notice pleading requirement of stating a "claim suffi-
ciently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions




North Dakota's Rules of Civil Procedure have replicated the FRCP since
1957,285 replacing a code-based system. 286 Notably, procedural progress in
North Dakota accompanied court rule-making in that state. 287 North Da-
kota's Supreme Court and legislature share equal footing in creating
procedural law. 288
281. 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 954 (effective July I, 1969, codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. IA- I (Supp.
1967)). For text of modern rules, see N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. IA. (1983). This loose-leaf volume contains
the rules of civil procedure.
282. For a detailed examination of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, see Sizemore.
General Scope and Philosophy of the New Rules, 5 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REv. 1 (1969).
283. See N.C. R. Ctv. P. 7(c). Demurrers were treated as 12(b)(6) motions following Sutton v.
Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161, 168 (1970).
284. N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l). See Sutton, 176 S.E.2d at 164-65 (seminal case interpreting North
Carolina Rule 8(a), discussing shift from code to notice pleading in North Carolina, discussing
influence of New York's civil procedure on North Carolina's and noting practical differences between
fact and notice pleading): see also Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 310 S.E.2d 326, 333 (1984): Stanback
v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181. 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
On North Carolina's adherence to precedent construing the FRCP, see Lewis v. Salem Academy &
College, 23 N.C. App. 122, 208 S.E.2d 404, 406, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 335, 210 S.E.2d 58 (1974);
Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 40, 187 S.E.2d 420, 421 (1972).
285. See 5B N.D. CENT. CODE (1974 & Supp. 1985) (replacement volume containing civil.
criminal, and appellate procedural rules). The North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on
July 1, 1957. N.D. R. Civ. P. 86(a). On the authoritative stature of the Federal Rules in construing their
North Dakota counterparts, see Byron v. Gerring Indus., Inc., 328 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1982); Gerhardt
v. D.L.K., 327 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1982); Phillips-Van Heusen Corp. v. Shark Bros., 289 N.W.2d 216
(N.D. 1980). On notice pleading in North Dakota courts, see Production Credit Ass'n v. Olson, 280
N.W.2d 920, 924 (N.D. 1979). See also WRIGHT I, supra note 1, § 9.35, at 70.
286. See WRIGHT 1, supra note 1, § 9.34, at 70.
287. See 1919 N.D. Laws § 6 ("The Supreme Court ... shall adopt uniform rules of procedure
for all of the district courts in each of the several judicial districts within the state."): 1941 N.D. Laws
238 (recognizing rule-making powers of North Dakota Supreme Court).
288. See N.D. CENT. CODE 99 27-02-09, 27-02-11, 27-02-13 (1974 & 1985 Supp.) (statutes
prescribing the supreme court's power to promulgate rules that supersede legislation): see also id. at
§ 27-0209, which provides:
All statutes relating to pleadings, practice, and procedure in civil or criminal actions, remedies, or
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OHIO
Federal Rules Replica
Ohio became an FRCP replica in 1970.289 Its rules were promulgated
pursuant to the Ohio'Supreme Court's constitutional rule-making power. 290
These rules supersede conflicting procedural statutes, 291 apparently even
subsequently enacted statutes, though the latter is unsettled. 292
OKLAHOMA
Notice Pleading/Federal Code Procedural System
Despite substantial federal influence on its procedure, 293 Oklahoma
retained an essentially fact pleading system294 until its legislature enacted
the Oklahoma Pleading Co.de, 295 which brought Oklahoma into the notice
proceedings, enacted by the legislative assembly, shall have force and effect only as rules of court
and shall remain in effect unless and until amended or otherwise altered by rules promulgated by
the supreme court.
289. "The new Ohio Civil Rules effective July 1, 1970 are patterned upon the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Ohio thus joins the many other states that have adopted civil rules patterned upon the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." 8 WEST'S Omo PRAcrIcE (publisher's preface) (containing annotated civil
rules 1-16); see also OHio REv. CODE AtN. (Page 1982) (1982 replacement volume containing text of
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure).
On notice pleading in Ohio, see Wilson V. Riverside Hosp., 18 Ohio St. 3d 8,479 N.E.2d 275, 277
(1985); City of Willoughby Hills v. CincinnatiIns. Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 177,4j9 N.E.2d 555, 558 (1984).
The persuasive effect of federal precedent on Ohio's construction of its rules is discussed in Schmidt v.
Avco Corp., 15 Ohio App. 3d 81, 472 N.E.2d 721, 724 (1984); see also Gilmore v. General Motors
Corp., 35 Ohio Misc. 36, 300 N.E.2d 259, 262 (1973).
290. See 8 WEST'S Otno PRAcnce at v (editor's preface).
291. Id. at vi.
292. Id. at vi-vii (citing Graley v. Satayaham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316,343 N.E.2d 832 (1976); Simon
v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164,355 N.E.2d 903 (1976); Jacobs v. Shelly & Sands,
Inc., 51 Ohio App. 2d 44, 5 Ohio Op. 3d 165,365 N.E.2d 1259 (1976)); see also Browne, CivilRule I
and the Principle of Primacy-A Guide to the Resolution of Conflicts Between Statutes and the Civil
Rules, 5 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 363,396-410 (1978); Giannelli, TheProposedOhioRules of Evidence: The
General Assembly, Evidence, and Rulemaking, 29 CASE W. REs. 16, 27-33 (1978).
293. See Hamilton, Pleading: Fact Pleading in Oklahoma-Time for a Change?, 30 OKLA. L.
Rev. 699 (1977), in which it is stated:
Oklahoma included many of the Field Code provisions as part of the original territorial rules of
civil procedure adopted in 1893, but a gradual incorporation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has taken place. One important provision, however, has remained unchanged: Section
264(2) of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1971) still reflects the fact pleading approach adopted
in the Field Code.
294. See Note, Pleading andProcedure, 6 OKLA. CrryU.L. REv. 251,254,257(1981) (analysis of
case law emphasizing importance of pleading facts, not legal conclusions under then-existing
Oklahoma procedure); see also Note, Pleading: Abolishing Fact Pleading, 34 OKLA. L. REv. 203
(1981) (assailing Oklahoma's then fact pleading system for the intractability of its metaphysical
distinctions between "ultimate facts," "evidentiary facts," and "conclusions of law").
295. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2001-2027 (West Supp. 1984). "This code is based on Federal
Rules 1 through 25, although there are some differences between the Federal Rules and the Oklahoma
provisions." Fraser, The Petition Under the New Pleading Code, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 245 (1985).
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pleading group. 296 At that time, Oklahoma's legislature, while yet to
relinquish rule-making power to the judiciary, placed into effect rules of
pleading297 andjoinder 298 substantially identical to Federal Rules 1 through
25.299 Decisions interpreting these FRCP counterparts will be considered
persuasive authority by Oklahoma courts in interpreting its new code.
3°°
OREGON
Fact Pleading/lIdiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System
Oregon's Council on Court Procedures promulgated the 1981 Oregon
Rules of Civil Procedure,30' an idiosyncratic set of procedural rules. These
rules abolished demurrers and pleas 302 and modeled Oregon third-party
practice after federal practice. 303 Oregon's numbering system differs
greatly from the FRCP system, and more significantly, so do Oregon's
rules for stating claims for relief and making motions to attack a claim's
sufficiency. Any Oregon pleading asserting a claim for relief must contain
a "plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a claim for
relief without unnecessary repetition." 304 Many Oregon provisions are,
296. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2008.A. 1. (West Supp. 1984) ("short and plain statement of
the claim"). See also id. § 2007.C. (abolishing demurrers and pleas).
297. See id. §§ 2008-2011.
298. See, e.g., id. §§ 2013.H; 2018.A-.B; 2019.A-.D; 2020.A-.C; 2021.
299. See supra note 295. Discovery provisions modeled on the Federal Rules were already in place
by the time of the 1984 reform. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3201-3214 (West 1982).
300. See Fraser, supra note 295, in which it is stated:
Provisions in the new code that are the same as a federal rule must be interpreted in the same
manner as the federal courts have interpreted the federal rule because the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has held that a statute that is copied from another jurisdiction must be interpreted the same as
it was interpreted by the highest court of the jurisdiction from which it was copied.
Id. at 245 (footnote omitted; citing Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 659 P.2d 930, 934 n.7 (Okla. 1983)).
301. The Council on Court Procedures acted pursuant to 1 OR. REv. STAT. § 1.735 (1977)
(providing that promulgated rules of procedure submitted to legislative assembly at beginning of each
regular session shall become effective 90 days after session's closing, subject to legislative right to
amend, repeal, or supplement any of the rules by statute). For present text of the Oregon Rules of Civil
Procedure, see IA OR. REv. STAT. ANN. (1984).
302. See OR. R. Ctv. P. 13C.
303. See OR. R. CIv. P. 22C. The period in which a third-party complaint may be filed as of right
differs in Oregon and federal practice. The Oregon period is within ninety, as opposed to ten, days of
service on the third-party plaintiff of the original plaintiff's summons and complaint. Compare OR. R.
Civ. P. 22C(l). with FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
304. OR. R. Civ. P. 18A; see also OR. R. Civ. P. 21A(8) (motion to remedy "failure to state
ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim"). "ORCP 18 A. continued Oregon as a 'fact pleading'
rather than a 'notice pleading' jurisdiction." Scovell v. TRK Trans., Inc. 299 Or. 679, 705 P.2d 1144,
1146 (1985).
"Oregon has been a code pleader since statehood. The general rule has been that a pleading must
contain factual allegations which, if proven, establish the right to relief sought." Davis v. Tyee Indus.,
Inc., 295 Or. 467, 668 P.2d 1186, 1191 (1982).
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nevertheless, substantially the same as their FRCP counterparts. 305 How-
ever, Oregon's "ultimate fact" pleading separates it from the FRCP juris-
dictions.
PENNSYLVANIA
Fact Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System
Pennsylvania, though its Supreme Court has long been vested with rule-
making power,306 has evinced a slow and piecemeal pattern of procedural
reform. 30 7 It retains a fact pleading system of procedure, 308 a general
division of law and equity,30 9 and different procedural rules for the discrete
common law "forms of action." 310 It has, however, abolished the sharply
criticized 31' practice of forbidding the joinder of claims under the forms of
assumpsit and trespass in the same action. 312 All counterclaims are per-
missive,313 although only transactionally related counterclaims are permit-
ted in equity actions.314
305. See, e.g., OR. R. Civ. P. 32 (class actions); OR. R. Civ. P. 29 (joinder of necessary and
indispensable parties); OR. R. Civ. P. 31 (interpleader). Oregon Rule lB states that "[t]hese rules shall
be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." OR. R. Civ. P.
lB.
306. "In 1937 general rulemaking power in civil actions was given [by the Pennsylvania General
Assembly] to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and a Procedural Rules Committee, appointed by the
court, began work in 1939." WRIGr I, supra note 1, § 9.39, at 72 (footnotes omitted). In 1968, the
power of the court to promulgate rules that would not modify substantive rights and that would
"suspend" inconsistent "laws" was written into Pennsylvania's constitution. See PA. CONsT. art. V,
§ 10(c).
307. Of the states undertaking major procedural reform since the advent of the Federal Rules,
"Pennsylvania has been influenced the least by the new concepts and improved techniques first
suggested in the Federal Rules." Wright, Modem Pleading and the Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. 909, 910 (1953).
308. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1019(a) ("material facts. . . shall be stated"); see also Alpha Tau Omega
Fraternity v. University of Pennsylvania, 464 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1983) ("Pennsylvania is a fact pleading
state. Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a). A complaint must not only give the defendant notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, but it must also formulate the issues by summarizing those
facts essential to support the claim."); Smith v. Brown, 283 Pa. Super. Ct. 116, 423 A.2d 743, 745
(1980).
Extensive statements of fact are evidently required. See Philadelphia v. Kane, 63 Pa. Commw. Ct.
643,438 A.2d 1051, 1052 (1982) ("The Pennsylvania system of fact pleading requires that the pleading
must define the issues, and every act or performance essential to that end must be set forth in the
complaint. ").
309. See generally PA. R. Civ. P. 1001-1292 ("Actions at Law"); 1501-1591 ("Action in Equity").
310. See, e.g., PA. R. Civ. P. 1051-1058 (special procedural rules for ejectment actions);
1061-1067 (quiet title actions); 1071-1087 (replevin actions); 1091-1099 (mandamus actions).
311. See Wright, supra note 307, at 923 (anomalous results of rule disallowing joinder of
transactionally-related assumpsit and trespass claims).
312. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1001.
313. SeePA.R. Civ. P.1031,1510.
314. PA. R. Civ. P. 1510(a).
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RHODE ISLAND
Federal Rules Replica
The Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure3 15 became effective January
10, 1966. With few exceptions, 316 these rules replicate the FRCP. They
abolish demurrers, 3 17 replace the general demurrer with the 12(b)(6) mo-
tion, 3 18 employ modern impleader, 319 and abandon fact pleading in favor of
the federal "short and plain statement of the claim." 320 Federal precedents
construing the Federal Rules are persuasive authority to Rhode Island
courts construing their own rules.321
SOUTH CAROLINA
Fact Pleading/Federal-Rules-Model Procedural System
Pursuant to a recent constitutional grant of limited rule-making power 322
and an even more recently enacted statute 323 regulating the use of this
315. 2B R.I. GEN. LAWS, (1970) (appendix) (containing "Rules of Civil Procedure"). The Rules
were adopted on June 9, 1965. Id. at 563.
Rule-making power is vested in Rhode Island's courts by statute. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-6-2 (1985)
(supreme court, superior court, family court, and district court have power to make their own
procedural rules and such rules, when valid, will supersede conflicting statutory provisions).
316. One interesting exception is in the last clause of Rhode Island Rule 13(a), the compulsory
counterclaim rule. This clause exempts from its scope counterclaims in motor vehicle tort cases that
would be handled by insurance company subrogees. See R.I. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (reporter's notes
explaining this rule's origin). Cf supra note 46 (similar qualification of compulsory counterclaim rule
in Alabama).
317. See R.I. R. Civ. P. 7(c).
318. See R.I. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
319. See R.I. R. Civ. P. 14.
320. See R.I. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1); Placido v. Mello, 492 A.2d 1226, 1227 (R.I. 1985) (notice
pleading).
321. See Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp., 489 A.2d 336, 339 (R.I. 1985) ("This court has stated
previously that where the federal rule and our state rule of procedure are substantially similar, we will
look to the federal courts for guidance or interpretation of our rule."); Nocero v. Lembo, IIl R.I. 17,
298 A.2d 800, 803 (1973) ("In construing the Superior Court Rules it has been a practice to look for
guidance in the precedents of the federal courts, upon whose rules those of the Superior Court are
closely patterned.").
322. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4 (supreme court's procedural rule-making power "[s]ubject to the
statutory law"). This power is thus "limited" in the sense that the legislature preserves a concurrent and
paramount authority to regulate both substantive and procedural law. See Comment, Practice and
Procedure-The Procedural Rule-Making Power of the South Carolina Supreme Court, 30S.C.L. REV.
625, 629-632 (1979) (analysis of constitutional source and scope of court's rule-making power).
323. No. 4, 1979 S.C. Acts (RII) (codified in relevant part at S.C. CODE ANN. 88 14-3-940,
14-3-950) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985). These statutes provide that court-promulgated rules of practice
and procedure, while subject to the legislature's veto power, will automatically take effect within 90
days of their submission to the legislature unless the legislature disapproves them by three-fifths vote in
a concurrent resolution. The legislature has subsequently recognized that such rules, when not
disapproved, "shall control" in the event of a statute/rule conflict in the area of practice and procedure.
1985 S.C. Acts No. 100, § 3. For text ofthis act, see S.C. CODEANN. § 15-1-10 (repealed) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1985) (editor's note).
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power, the South Carolina Supreme Court has promulgated federally-
modeled rules of civil procedure. 324 Although in many respects a replica of
the Federal Rules, the new South Carolina Rules expressly continue the fact
pleading32 of South Carolina's previous code-based procedural system. 326
SOUTH DAKOTA
Federal Rules Replica
The South Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure327 were adopted by the South
Dakota Supreme Court pursuant to a statutory grant of rule-making author-
ity concurrent and arguably coextensive with that of the legislature. 328
These rules, despite the apparent oddity of their split-numbered scheme, 329
replicate the Federal Rules, including their notice pleading language. 330
Federal authorities interpreting the FRCP are persuasive in their interpreta-
tion.331
324. S.C.R. Civ. P. 86.
325. See S.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief"); 10(b) ("cause of action"); 12(b)(6) ("failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action"). The reporter's note adds: "Rule 8(a) is in the same general language as the Federal
Rule with the important distinction that the State practice requiring pleading of the facts (rather than a
'statement of the claim') is retained." 22 S.C. CODE ANN. 403 (Court Rules) (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp.
1985).
For cases on fact pleading in South Carolina, see Crowley v. Bob Jones University, 268 S.C. 492,234
S.E.2d 879, 881 (1977) ("Furthermore, a litigant is required to plead 'ultimate facts', that is, the facts
which evidence upon trial will prove, and not the evidence necessary to prove those facts." (citing
Stroud v. Riddle, 260 S.C. 99, 194 S.E.2d 235 (1973))); Moore v. City of Columbia, 284 S.C. 278,326
S.E.2d 157, 160 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) ("In our State, the complaint is sufficient if it informs the
defendant of the ultimate facts supporting each element of the cause of action; there is no necessity that
the complaint state all the evidence to be presented upon the trial of the case.").
326. South Carolina's civil procedure prior to the new rules dated back to the adoption of a Field-
type code in 1870. See WmrIrr I, supra note 1, § 9.42, at 74.
327. See S.D. CODFiED LAWS ANN. §8 15-6-1 to 15-6-86 (1984).
328. See Comment, An Inevitable Clash ofPower? Determining the ProperRole ofthe Legislature
in the Administration of Justice, 22 S.D.L. REv. 387, 396 & n.67 (1977).
329. Because the rules may, even today, be at least partly products of legislative action, see S.D.
CONsr. art. 5, § 12, perhaps it is appropriate that they are codified in statutory form. At any rate, the
split-numbered system merely adds, as prefixes, the title and volume number to a rule number that is
otherwise identical to its federal counterpart (e.g., S.D. CODIFmD LAWS ANN. § 15-6-12(b) corresponds
to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)).
330. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 15-6-8(a)(1) ("short and plain statement of the claim").
331. See, e.g., National Surety Corp. v. Shoemaker, 86 S.D. 302, 195 N.W. 134, 139 (1972)
("While we are not bound by the construction given by the federal courts to language taken from their
rules and incorporated into ours, we do accept it as a guide in determining the meaning of that which we
have adopted."); Wilson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 198, 157 N.W. 19, 21 (1968) ("Summary
judgment is a comparatively new procedure in this state and became a part of our practice when we
adopted the federal rules of civil procedure. Consequently we turn to the federal court decisions for





Tennessee, an FRCP replica, adopted the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure on January 26, 1970.332 It has abandoned fact pleading and
adopted FRCP 8(a)'s notice pleading language. 333 The Tennessee Supreme
Court is statutorily empowered to make rules "consistent with statutes." 334
Federal Rules' precedents are persuasive authority to Tennessee courts
construing their own replicas. 335
TEXAS
Fact Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System
Texas is an idiosyncratic jurisdiction heavily influenced by both the
common law and the FRCP. In organization and enumeration the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure 336 show little similarity to the FRCP. 337 A Texas
original pleading must contain "a short statement of the cause of action
sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved, ' 338 a strange require-
ment mixing regressive code terminology with progressive notice pleading
language. 339 Demurrers have been expressly abolished. 34° The special
332. SeeTENN. R. civ. P. 1 (compiler's notes). Cf WRIGHTII, supra note9, § 9.44, at 63 ("February
20, 1970"). A supreme court order of October 12, 1970, provided that the rules would take effect after
January 1, 1971. Id. A subsequent supreme court orderdated April 24, 1973, provided that the rules should
apply retrospectively to all civil actions commencing before January 1, 1971, to the extent that such
application was necessary to fill a procedural gap left by the legislative repeal ofcertain code sections. Id.
(explaining repeal of code section 5 by 1972 Tenn. Pub. Acts 565).
333. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 8.01; see also Sobieski, Jr.,A Survey of Civil Procedure in Tennessee-
1977, 46 TENN. L. REv. 300, 308-18 (1979) (suggesting that pleading rules may vary with the cause of
action and indicating tremendous role judicial interpretation of Rule 8's "short and plain statement of
the claim" plays in determining whether or not particular pleadings will be dismissed).
334. WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.44, at 63.
335. See Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337, 338 (Tenn. 1976) (relying on federal
decisions to interpret Rule 14, identical to FRCP 14);Jerkins v. McKinney, 533 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Tenn.
1976) ("In the absence of Tennessee authority we are forced to look to treatises and cases construing the
similar federal rule.").
336. See TEXAS RULES OF COURT (West 1983). The Texas Supreme Court promulgated these rules
pursuant to 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 108.
337. See generally WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.45, at 63. The Texas Supreme Court has had
virtually unfettered statutory rule-making power for nearly half a century. Id.
338. TEX. R. Civ. P. 47(a).
339. Rule 47(a)'s requirement of stating a "cause of action" undercuts its liberal language about
"fair notice" with an apparent requirement of pleading facts beyond those required for mere notice of
claim. Most Texas decisions agree with the proposition that "[a] petition is sufficient if it gives fair and
adequate notice of thefacts upon which the pleader bases his claim." Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804,
810 (Tex. 1982) (emphasis added); see also Murray v. 0 & A Express, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex.
1982) ("The office of pleadings is to define the issues at trial. Pleadings should give fair and adequate
notice of the facts upon which the pleader relies".) In Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, (Tex.
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exception is used to point out defects in pleading, 341 including a demand for
more particularity.342 Texas' Rules of Court governing compulsory and
permissive counterclaims are identical in substance to their FRCP counter-
parts,343 as are many of the rules governing parties and discovery.344 Rule 1
provides for a liberal construction of the rules themselves, 345 but Texas'
procedural quirks mark it as an idiosyncratic jurisdiction rather than a
Federal Rule model.
1979), the court, reviewing a summary judgment ruling, stated that a cause of action must be pled and
that:
[i]n determining whether a cause of action was pled, plaintiff's pleadings must be adequate for the
court to be able, from an examination of the plaintiff's pleadings alone, to ascertain with
reasonable certainty and without resorting to information aliunde the elements of plaintiff's cause
of action and the relief sought with sufficient information upon which to base a judgment.
Id. at 683. At least one commentator has noted that the strange mixed terminology of Texas Rule 47
"make[s it extremely difficult to classify the present system of pleading in that state." McMahon,
supra note 172, at 375-76.
340. Texas Rule 90 begins with the statement: "General demurrers shall not be used." All defects
not excepted to under Rule 91 are waived.
341. TEx. R. Civ. P. 91 states:
Special Exceptions: A special exception shall not only point to the particular pleading excepted to,
but it shall also point out intelligibly and with particularity the defect, omission, obscurity,
duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency in the allegations in the pleading excepted to.
342. See Johnson v. Willis, 596 S.W.2d 256,260 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) ("The special exception is
properly used to demand particularity in pleadings if pleadings do not properly apprise a party of his
opponent's intentions."). Courts have distinguished the special exception from the general demurrer.
The latter cannot be used to assert that the petitioner has failed to state a cause of action. McKamey v.
Kinnear, 554 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972), Huff v. Fidelity Union Life Ins., 158 Tex. 433, 312
S.W.2d 493, 499 (1958).
343. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 97.
344. Texas Rules governing parties to a suit which are similar or identical to the Federal Rules
include: Texas Rule 38, "Third Party Practice" (Federal Rule 14); Texas Rule 39, "Joinder of Persons
Needed for Just Adjudication" (Federal Rule 19); Texas Rule 40, "Permissive Joinder of Parties"
(Federal Rule 20); Texas Rule 41, "Misjoinder and Non-Joinder of Parties" (Federal Rule 21); Texas
Rule 42, "Class Actions" (Federal Rule 23); Texas Rule 43, "Interpleader" (Federal Rule 22(1)). The
discovery rules are substantially the same, and are contained in the Pre-Trial Procedure Section, which
also includes Texas Rule 166, "Pre-trial Procedure: Formulating Issues" (modeled on Federal Rule 16),
and Texas Rule 166-A "Summary Judgment" (adopted from Federal Rule 56). Texas Rule 167 is the
counterpart to Federal Rule 34, Texas Rule 167(a) to Federal Rule 35, Texas Rule 168 to Federal Rule
33, and Texas Rule 169 to Federal Rule 36.
345. Tax. R. Civ. P. I states:
The proper objective of rules of civil procedure is to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial
adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive law. To the end
that this objective may be attained with as great expedition and dispatch and at the least expense
both to the litigants and to the state as may be practicable, these rules shall be given a liberal
construction.
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UTAH
Federal Rules Replica
Utah became an FRCP jurisdiction when the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure took effect on January 1, 1950346 and superseded all conflicting
laws. The Utah Supreme Court promulgated these Federal replications
using its plenary rule-making power. 347 Utah's rules embrace the philoso-
phy of notice pleading348 and its courts consider Federal Rules' precedents




Vermont became a "Federal Rules Replica" in 1971 when the Supreme
Court exercised its rule-making power to adopt the Vermont Rules of Civil
Procedure. 350 The Vermont Rules are perhaps the most expertly crafted of
all the FRCP replicas, 351 and are accompanied by unusually informative
annotations comparing them to the federal template. 352 Vermont's transi-
tion from an idiosyncratic procedural system combining elements of both
common-law and quasi-code pleading was smoothed by legislative adop-
tion of much of the substance of the Federal Rules in 1959.353 But replica
status was not attained until the 1971 Vermont Rules accomplished both the
346. See UTAH R. Civ. P. l(b); see also WRIGHT II, § 9.46, at 64.
347. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-4 (1953) (superseded) (authorizing supreme court to make
rules).
348. See Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325,
1328 (Utah 1975).
349. See In re Estate of Cassity, 656 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1982) (citing federal cases construing
Rule 63(a)); Sanpete County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Price River Water Users Ass'n, 652 P.2d 1302,
1306 n.5 (Utah 1982) (citing federal cases interpreting FRCP 19(a) when applying Utah rule).
350. These rules appear in VT. STAT. ANN. "Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure" (1971 & 1983
Cum. Supp.). See 1949 Vt. Acts 56, § I (amendment of Vermont Code to allow Vermont judges and
justices to make pleading and procedure rules). The Rules Enabling Act makes rules promulgated
pursuant to the Vermont Supreme Court's procedural rule-making power subject to legislative repeal,
revision and modification. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1 (1973 & Supp. 1984).
351. See WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.47, at 64 (Vermont rules "in essence the federal rules
expertly adapted for state practice").
352. "The rules are based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal cases interpreting the
Federal rules are an authoritative source for the interpretation of identical provisions of the Vermont
Rules." VT. STAT. ANN. "Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure," VT. R. Civ. P. 1, at 8 (reporter's
notes) (1971); see also Margison v. Spriggs, 499 A.2d 756, 758 (Vt. 1985) (applying Vermont Rule 56
and citing reporter's note to Vermont Rule 1).
353. "The rules, which in essence are the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure adapted
for state practice, do not represent a major change for Vermont. Since 1959, our statutes have contained
many of the specific provisions of the Federal Rules, such as simplified pleading, discovery, and appeal
procedure." VT. STAT. ANN. Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure at xiii (foreword) (1971 & 1983
Cum. Supp.).
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merger of law and equity and conformity to the amended Federal Rules
respecting joinder and discovery.354
VIRGINIA
Fact Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System
Virginia's idiosyncratic procedural system has statutory underpin-
nings355 that maintain a "law-equity" bifurcation under judicially promul-
gated rules of practice. 356 Counterclaims are not compulsory in Virginia at
law357 or in equity.358 In Virginia, attorneys may demur to pleadings. 359
One of Virginia procedure's most modern aspects is a third-party practice
provision similar to the Federal Rule.360 Virginia's pleading rule361 calls for
facts as if they were but means to notice: "Every pleading shall state the
facts on which the party relies in numbered paragraphs, and it shall be
sufficient if it clearly informs the opposite party of the true nature of the
claim or defense. ", 362 Although Virginia has been called a notice pleading
state,363 recent cases are to the contrary.364 Despite its antiquated wording
and disjointed structure, Virginia's procedural system shares common
ground with the FRCP, 365 but not enough to justify classification as
substantially a model of the Federal Rules.
354. See VT. R. Civ. P. 2 (merger); VT. R. Civ. P. 19 (joinder); VT. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (discovery);
Lemnah v. American Breeders Service, Inc., 144 Vt. 568,482 A.2d 700,705 (1984) (notice pleading).
355. See VA. CODE §§ 8.01-1 to 8.01-688 (1984) ("Civil Remedies and Procedure").
356. See VA. CODE § 8.01-270 (1984) (case brought on "wrong side of court" will not be dismissed
but shall be transferred to the correct side); see also 11 VA. CODE (1985 Rules of Virginia Supreme
Court); VA. CODE § 8.01-271 (1984). The Supreme Court's rules deal with the differences between law
and equity procedure. Virginia Rules 2:1-2:20 concern equity practice and procedure; Rules 3:1-3:18
deal with practice and procedure in actions at law. Though equitable defenses long have been available
in legal actions, Virginia's procedural differences between the two kinds of legal action persist. See
Greer, Virginia and the Federal Rules, 47 VA. L. REv. 906, 908 (1961).
357. VA. R. 3:8.
358. VA. R. 2:13. The noncompulsory equitable counterclaiming device is denominated a "cross-
bill" in Virginia practice.
359. VA. R. 3:7.
360. VA. R. 3:10.
361. See VA. R. 1:4.
362. VA. R. 1:4(d).
363. Greer, supra note 356, at 909.
364. See Board of Supervisors v. Market Inns, Inc., 228 Va. 82, 319 S.E.2d 737, 740 n.2 (1984)
("[N]o court can base its judgment on facts not alleged or upon a right which has not been pleaded and
claimed.") (citing Ted Lansing Supply v. Royal Aluminum, 221 Va. 1139, 1141,277 S.E.2d 228, 229
(1981)).
365. See Greer, supra note 356, at 922-23.
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WASHINGTON
Federal Rules Replica
Since 1960, Washington's civil procedure has been modeled on the
Federal Rules. 366 Washington's Superior Court Civil Rules completed
Washington's conversion to full-fledged federal replica status. 367 Washing-
ton looks to decisions construing the counterpart Federal Rules for per-
suasive authority in its own constructions. 368 Like Vermont, Washington




The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, pursuant to its plenary
statutory rule-making power, 370 adopted West Virginia's Rules of Civil
Procedure37' on October 13, 1959. Replicated from the Federal Rules, the
366. See WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.50, at 66 ("In 1960, when rules based on Federal Rules 7 to
25, covering the important subjects of pleading and joinder, became effective, Washington procedure
conformed in all its most important aspects to procedure in the federal courts.") (footnote omitted).
Before 1967, the Washington Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure contained the civil as well as
criminal rules for Washington's Superior Courts. These rules followed the FRCP in substance but their
numbering system corresponded to a lesser degree than that of Washington's modem rules. The Rules
of Pleading, Practice and Procedure (RPPP) merged with the General Rules of the Superior Courts
(GRSC) in 1960 to remedy the inconvenience of having two sets of procedural rules. At this time, the
Rules were renumbered to correspond more closely to the FRCP. See 3 ORLAND'S WASHINGTON
PRACrICE 131 (West 1960) (superseded). Text of the revised and renumbered RPPP are in this volume;
the modem rules' numbering system corresponds to the FRCP more closely.
367. See WASHINGTON COURT RULES, at 417 (West 1985).
368. In re Green, 14 Wn. App. 939, 546 P.2d 1230, 1232 (1976) ("When a federal court rule has
been adopted as the state rule, the construction of the federal rule is pertinent."); see also Eberle v.
Sutor, 3 Wn. App. 387, 475 P.2d 564 (1970) ("Where a federal rule has been adopted as the state rule,
the construction of the former should be applied to the latter." (citing 71 Wn. 2d xvii-xxiv)).
369. See generally, Meisenholder, Piecemeal Adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Washington, 26 F.R.D. 123 (1960); Green, Procedural Progress in Washington, 26 WASH. L. REv. 87
(1951).
370. W. VA. CODE § 51-1-4 (1982) (court rules supersede conflicting statutes). The reform brought
about by the adoption of a set of federal replications was extensive. See W. VA. CODE Preface (1966)
("The West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1959, affect many sections of the Code,
especially those dealing with procedure, which have been neither amended nor repealed since the
adoption of the Rules.").
371. 1A W. VA. CODE (1982) (entitled "Court Rules" and containing "Rules of Civil Procedure for
Trial Courts of Record") [hereinafter W. VA. R. Civ. P.]. These Rules were effective July 1, 1960. See
WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.51, at 67.
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West Virginia Rules instituted notice pleading, 372 abolished demurrers, 373
and ended pleas in abatement. 374 West Virginia courts utilize Federal
Rules' precedents in construing their own similar rules. 375
WISCONSIN
Notice Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural System
Wisconsin's procedural system 376 is idiosyncratic but shows substantial
FRCP influence. The numbering and organization of Wisconsin's pro-
cedural provisions differ greatly from the federal scheme. 377 Wisconsin
extensively revised its procedure ii 1975378 by breaking with a system thit
bore a greater resemblance to the original Field Code than any other up to
that year. 37 9 The new system abolished demurrers and pleas380 and aban-
doned the former pleading requirement of a "plain and concise statement of
the ultimate facts constituting each cause of action, without unnecessary
repetition." ' 381 Instead, the new system requires a "short and plain state-
ment of the claim identifying the transaction, occurrence or event. . . and
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 382 The motion to dismiss for
"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" was added383 and
the new provisions were to be construed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. 384 Wisconsin's
new procedure does not recognize compulsory counterclaims. 385
372. See, e.g., W. VA. R. Crv. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6).
373. W. VA. R. Civ. P. 7(c).
374. Id.
375. See Peneschi v. National Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 1, 13 n.12 (W. Va. 1982) ("Federal decisions
interpreting Rule 15(c) have precedential value in West Virginia.") (citing Plum v. Mitter, 157 W. Va.
773, 204 S.E.2d 8 (1974)); see also Nellas v. Loucas, 156 W. Va. 77,191 S.E.2d 160,163 (1972) (citing
federal cases in application of Rule 8(c)).
376. See generally WlscoNsn' CouRT RULES AND PROCEDURE §§ 801.01-807.11 (West 1984)
(general procedural provisions).
377. Id. The Wisconsin provisions are identified as sections, in the manner of a code, and are
organized by chapter.
378. The revision took place through orders of the Wisconsin Supreme Court on February 17,
1975, September 30, 1975, and October 6, 1976. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 801-802 (West Supp. 1984).
379. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 260.01 (West 1975) (interpretive commentary stating that Wisconsin
Civil Procedure "is based largely on the Field Code").
380. See Wis. CT. R.P. 802.01(3) (abolishing demurrers and pleas). Cf. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 263.01-263.47 (West 1957) (provisions governing use of demurrers).
381. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 263.03(2) (West 1957).
382. Wis Cr. R.P. § 802.02(1)(a).
383. See Wis Cr. R.P. § 802.06(2)(f).
384. See Wis. Cr. R.P. § 801.01(2).
385. See Wis. Cr. R.P. § 802.07.
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WYOMING
Federal Rules Replica
In 1957, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 386 transformed Wyo-
ming's civil procedure from code pleading 387 into a notice pleading replica
of the Federal Rules. 388 Amendments effective in 1971 conformed the
Wyoming rules to the joinder389 and discovery 390 provisions of the
amended FRCP, preserving Wyoming's replica status. The Wyoming
Supreme Court considers federal rules decisions persuasive authority in
interpreting its own similar rules. 391 The Court has enjoyed "complete rule-
making power" by statute since 1947.392
IV. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA ON
DISTRIBUTION OF AMERICAN STATE COURT SYSTEMS
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
We have appended an extensive series of tables and charts to assist in the
difficult task of assimilating data concerning 51 separate systems of civil
procedure and comparing those 51 systems to the system of civil procedure
deployed in the federal courts. Table I groups all the jurisdictions included
in the survey according to the classification of their procedural system.
Where the date of key procedural reform was disclosed in the survey, it is
included in the far right column of Table I. Within each classification the
jurisdictions are listed in order of the date of reform; 393 when no date is
386. See Wyo. STAT., "Court Rules" (1979 and 1986 Supp.) (containing text of Wyoming Rules of
Civil Procedure). These Rules took effect December 1, 1957. See Wyo. R. Civ. P. 86.
387. See Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-1006to89-1013 (1931) (superseded) (various rules governing
demurrers); see id. § 89-1004 (petition to contain "statement of the facts constituting the cause of action
in ordinary and concise language"). See generally WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.53, at 69 (Wyoming
code adopted in 1869 and remained in effect until federal replicas became effective December 1, 1957).
388. See Clark, supra note 259 (Judge Clark's 1958 speech before the Wyoming bar applauding
Wyoming's replication of the Federal Rules). See also WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.53, at 69. On notice
pleading in Wyoming, see Guggenmos v. Tom Searl-Frank McCue, Inc., 481 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1971)
(permissible to plead facts or legal conclusions as long as fair notice is given to parties); Watts v.
Holmes, 386 P.2d 718 (Wyo. 1963) (pleadings should give notice of what adverse party may expect).
389. See, e.g., Wyo. R. Civ. P. 19 (as amended October 21, 1970, effective February 11, 1971)
(virtually identical to Federal Rule 19(a), as amended 1966; substantially equivalent to Federal Rule
19(b)-(c), as amended 1966).
390. See, e.g., Wyo. R. Civ. P. 26 (as amended October 21, 1970, effective February 11, 1971)
(virtually identical to Federal Rule 26, as amended 1970).
391. See, e.g., Whitefoot v. Hanover Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 717, 720 (Wyo. 1977) ("As there is no
Wyoming case law specifically discussing [Rule 52(a)], we will rum to the federal case law interpreting
the similar federal rule .... ").
392. WRIGHT II, supra note 9, § 9.53, at 69 & n.15 (citing Wyo. STAT. § 1-116 (1957)).
393. For those categories of procedural systems that are based in large part on the Federal Rules,
the date indicated is the effective date of the jurisdiction's reformed system of procedure. The date of
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given the jurisdictions are listed alphabetically. Included as the left hand
column of Table I is the population of each jurisdiction (in thousands of
people) according to the 1980 federal census. 394
Listed first are the 23 federal replica jurisdictions. The group of three
jurisdictions that have rules-based procedural systems falling short of
replica status but are nonetheless closely patterned on the Federal Rules are
listed next. The next group of four jurisdictions are those with procedural
codes that, despite the important systematic difference between rules-
based and code-based procedural systems, set forth rules of state civil
procedure substantially the same as the Federal Rules. The following group
of three jurisdictions operate under idiosyncratic rules of procedure but
follow the Federal Rules' conception of notice pleading, as does the sui
generis jurisdiction of New Hampshire. The next group of three jurisdic-
tions operate under rules-based systems of procedure patterned on the
Federal Rules except in the crucial aspect of pleading policy.
Listed next are eight jurisdictions that feature idiosyncratic systems of
judicially promulgated procedural rules which demand factual specificity
in pleading. Listed last are the six jurisdictions that combine fact pleading
and code-based systems of procedure.
As this summary makes obvious, replicas of the Federal Rules are by far
the most common procedural system among the state courts. But for the
various reasons documented in the survey, it cannot be said that a majority
of states follow the Federal Rules without important qualifications. None-
theless, a significant plurality ofjurisdictions are Federal Rules replicas, as
graphically displayed in Chart I.
The succeeding charts show how the Federal Rules' predominance as the
model of state court civil procedure becomes especially dramatic if looser
tests for affinity to the Federal Rules are used. Chart II uses substantial
similarity in the enumeration and organization of state court rules of
1942 given for the District of Columbia is the date of replication of the Federal Rules by the newly
created Municipal Court of that jurisdiction. See supra note 103. Two of the replica jurisdictions,
Montana and Washington, reformed their procedures in a two step process culminating in replica status
after an earlier conversion to a looser model of the federal system of procedure. See supra notes 230-34,
366-69 and accompanying text. For these two jurisdictions, the latter date of conversion to replica
status is the date listed. The dates given for notice pleading jurisdictions with idiosyncratic rules-based
systems of procedure are, for Iowa and Wisconsin, the dates of conversion to notice pleading by
amended rule. See supra notes 150, 378, and accompanying text. For Michigan, the listed date is 1985,
the effective date of the new Michigan rules. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
394. The source of the population data is STATISTCAL AsMAtcr oF Ta UN ED STATES 12-13
(Table 12) (1985). The figures given for each state by the Census Bureau are rounded, and the sum they
yield in our Table I and accompanying charts is accordingly not identical to the rounded sum of the
actual figures for state-by-state population. See id. at xv. In the interest of consistency we have ignored
the discrepancy caused by rounding, and use as the total population of the United States in 1980 the sum
of the Census Bureau's rounded figures for each state (226,549,000). The rounded sum of the
unrounded state-by-state populations is 226,546,000. Id. at 12 (Table 12).
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procedure as the test for affinity to the Federal Rules, without disqualifica-
tion according to the strict criteria of federal replica status. Thus, all the
rules-based procedural systems patterned generally after the Federal Rules
are included, whether or not notice pleading is permitted, as well as the
systems based on codified analogues to the Federal Rules.
Chart III is based on pleading policy alone. Like Chart II, it shows that a
loosening of criteria for affinity to the Federal Rules reveals important
similarity to the Federal Rules in two-thirds of the states.
Chart IV carries this process of looking for systematic affinity to the
Federal Rules to its logical extreme, with rules-based systems of procedure
the only criterion. By this measure the ascendancy of the Federal Rules
over the Field Codes of the last century becomes quite evident.
But this is not the whole story. As we compiled our survey we noted that
the distribution of replica status among the states was not random accord-
ing to the populations of the various states. States with large populations
seemed to be less likely to have systematically modeled their civil pro-
cedures on the Federal Rules than less populous states. To test this hypoth-
esis we added the population data appearing in Table I.
Table II presents the same data as Table I, omitting dates, but is sorted in
descending order of state population. It is apparent that systematic state
court affinity for the Federal Rules is heavily concentrated among the less
populous states.
The Federal Rules' dominance as a model of state court civil procedure is
dramatically reduced when viewed as a function of the populations served
by the various state court systems. Charts V through VIII make this point
by recasting the data displayed in Charts I through IV in terms of state
populations. Table III explains the derivation of the population data dis-
played in Charts V through VIII.
Chart IX collects the data on date of federal replication from Table I, and
shows that trend to have stalled a decade ago. Chart X shows, however, that
procedural reform continues to creep ahead if all systematic adaptations of
the Federal Rules to state practice are counted, and Chart XI shows a
similar rate of creeping but steady reform in terms of the introduction of
notice pleading. 395
395. For purposes of Chart XI, New Hampshire is treated as having instituted notice pleading in
1982, the date of the leading decision we quote as establishing New Hampshire as a notice pleading
jurisdiction, see supra note 258 and accompanying text, and Michigan is treated as having become a
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V. CONCLUSION
By a strict test of replication, in fewer than half the states is it true that
there is "but one procedure for state and federal courts. ,396 But it is no
small testament to the genius of Judge Clark that this statement is un-
qualifiedly true in 23 out of 51 local American jurisdictions. Moreover, the
Federal Rules dominate the procedural systems of a substantial majority of
state court civil procedural systems if the test for affinity to the Federal
Rules is relaxed somewhat from the strict standard we devised in our search
for unqualified federal replicas.
Two factors caution, however, against exaggeration of the dominance of
the Federal Rules in modern American state courts. First, populous states
have proven unusually inert to procedural reform. Second, the era of an
"accelerating trend" 397 of state court reform of civil procedure in the image
of the Federal Rules has ended. The trend continues, albeit slowly, but with
ratchet-like effect. Perhaps the best memorial to Judge Clark is the stark
fact implicit in our survey that no jurisdiction, having adopted the Federal
Rules in substantial part, has seen fit to return to its old ways.
But our survey warns that the old ways persist in more than a few
jurisdictions, and that a majority of our national population lives in these
jurisdictions. Now that the momentum of the Federal Rules as a model for
state court reform has subsided, there remains much work to be done. For
the Federal Rules to continue to win converts among the states it is more
important than ever that the system of procedure embodied by those rules
be shown to be not just the newest or most commonplace, but the best.
396. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
397. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
1427










































































































































































































































































































































































Washington Law Review Vol. 61:1367, 1986
CHART 1:
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TABLE M
DERIVATION OF CHART V
(subtotals derived from Table I)
59890 SUBTOTAL OF REPLICA POPULATION
4265 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICEIFED RULES POPULATION
16734 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICEIFED CODE POPULATION
16882 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/IDIO RULES POPULATION
921 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/IDIOSYN POPULATION
6002 SUBTOTAL OF FACT/FED RULES POPULATION
60318 SUBTOTAL OF FACT/IDIO RULES POPULATION
61537 SUBTOTAL OF FACT/CODE POPULATION
226549 Total population (1980 census) in 000's
DERIVATION OF CHART VI
59890 SUBTOTAL OF REPLICA POPULATION
4265 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/FED RULES POPULATION
16734 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/FED CODE POPULATION
6002 SUBTOTAL OF FACT/FED RULES POPULATION
86891 Total population of state court procedural systems that conform substantially to the federal model
16882 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/IDIO RULES POPULATION
921 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/IDIOSYN POPULATION
60318 SUBTOTAL OF FACT/IDIO RULES POPULATION
61537 SUBTOTAL OF FACT/CODE POPULATION
139658 Total population of state court procedural systems substantially dissimilar from the federal model
DERIVATION OF CHART VII
59890 SUBTOTAL OF REPLICA POPULATION
4265 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/FED RULES POPULATION
16734 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/FED CODE POPULATION
16882 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICEIDIO RULES POPULATION
921 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICEIIDIOSYN POPULATION
98692 Total population of notice pleading jurisdictions
6D02 SUBTOTAL OF FACTIFED RULES POPULATION
60318 SUBTOTAL OF FACT/IDIO RULES POPULATION
61537 SUBTOTAL OF FACT/CODE POPULATION
127857 Total population of fact pleading jurisdictions
DERIVATION OF CHART VIII
59890 SUBTOTAL OF REPLICA POPULATION
4265 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/FED RULES POPULATION
16882 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/IDIO RULES POPULATION
6002 SUBTOTAL OF FACT/FED RULES POPULATION
60318 SUBTOTAL OF FACT/lDIO RULES POPULATION
147357 Total population of jurisdictions with rules-based systems of civil procedure
16734 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/FED CODE POPULATION
61537 SUBTOTAL OF FACT/CODE POPULATION
78271 Total population ofjurisdictions with code-based systems of civil procedure
921 SUBTOTAL OF NOTICE/IDIOSYN POPULATION
921 Population of singlejurisdiction (New Hampshire) with idiosyncratic system of civil procedure
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CHART IX:
PACE OFSTATE COURT REPUCATION OF FRCP
0 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 [ 1 1 1 t 1 1 l 1 It) I 1 1 1
99 99 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 66 6 7 7 8 8
8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4
Year of state replication of FRCP
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CHART Xl:
PACE OF ADVENT OF NOTICE PLEATING
BY FEDERAL RULES REPLICATION AND OTHERWISE
'>4'
1 1 1 1g1g 1g 1 g1 11 1 191 
11g199 99969999 9999 999699999999g
34 4444 5 5566 6667 7777 669
8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4
Year of state refo=
1434
Total number of
states that have
replicated the
PRCP
Total number of
states that have
relormed
procedure to
resemble FRCP
35i30
Total number of
states that
practice notice
pleading
